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PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE DO NOT CITE OR DISTRIBUTE
Abstract
I address David Albouy’s (2006) critique of the data constructed by Daron Acemoglu, Si-
mon Johnson and James Robinson (2001). The contribution of this paper is to instrument for
settler mortality rates that are collected from historical sources — and that may be measured
with error — with a geographic model of the determinants of disease. I ﬁrst establish that
my instruments are signiﬁcant predictors of mortality and are otherwise excludable to institu-
tions. Among other things, the excludability is established by a falsiﬁcation exercise, in which
I document that the geographic potential for mortality strongly aected institutions in former
colonies, yet it had no eect on institutions in the rest of the world. This dierential eect
settler mortality had on development can only be rationalized by the early institution building
hypothesis that Acemoglu et al. argue for. I next repeat the analysis of Acemoglu et al. in-
strumenting for the historical mortality rate with its geographic projection. The instrumented
mortality rate is a highly signiﬁcant predictor of institutional quality. Moreover, this result is
true when instrumenting for either the original data or the revised mortality series of Albouy.
This result is also true when accounting for the population that the historical data was sampled
from. Turning to the instrumental variable estimations, I show that also the relation between
institutions and income is highly signiﬁcant and that the associated importance of institutions
for international income dierences is substantial. Again this ﬁnding is true when using either
of the two historical series and also when accounting for the population that the historical
data was sampled from. I thus conclude that the empirical results presented in Acemoglu et
al. indeed reﬂect their early institution building hypothesis rather than measurement error.
Contact: Email: raphael.auer@snb.ch, I thank Daron Acemoglu, Josh Angrist, Andrei Shleifer and
especially Gerard Padro-I-Miguel for helpful discussions. I thank Domagoj Arapovic for excellent research
assistance.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
With their seminal work on the eﬀect colonization policies had on comparative development,
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (2001) develop a strong case for the im-
portance of property rights institutions as the ultimate cause of economic prosperity. Building on
earlier work of Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1998), and Hall and Jones
(1999), the authors argue that early settlement policies were inﬂuenced by the mortality rates
potential settlers faced in the colonies. They show that the number of Europeans that settled in
a colony inﬂuenced the colonization policies adopted by imperialist nations, with very diﬀerent
associated institutional outcomes.
The authors’ most important contribution is to construct an instrumental variable — the mor-
tality rate of European settlers in former colonies — that is strongly related to institutional quality,
yet has no direct impact on income diﬀerences. Using their measure of the settler mortality rate
in former colonies, the authors establish that institutions are the main determinant of economic
prosperity.
Collecting the mortality rates of settlers during colonization is a diﬃcult task, and Acemoglu
et al. rely on several sources to construct their series of mortality rates for 64 countries. Their
most important source is Curtin (1989), who collected mortality rates from soldiers stationed in
former colonies. However, this measure is not available for many nations and the authors thus
rely on mortality rates of bishops from Guiterrez (1986) and on mortality rates of laborers from
Curtin (1998).
When working with data that originated up to 300 years ago and is collected from various
sources, it is inevitable that coverage is incomplete and that the data is measured with some
error. David Albouy’s (2006)1 comment on the quality of this data, however, does not address
the mere fact that there may be additional noise in the data. Rather, he asserts that the settler
mortality data suﬀers from systematic shortcomings that create a measurement error correlated
with economic outcomes, hence generating an artiﬁcial correlation between mortality estimates
and institutional outcomes.
1Two versions of Albouy’s critique exist (Albouy (2004) and (2006)). In what follows below, I refer only
to the data constructed for the 2006 version, which can also be downloaded for David Albouy’s webpage
(http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~albouy/).
2His critique focuses in particular on three issues. First, he claims that the data is measured
inconsistently when there are multiple mortality rates to choose from for a country. For example,
this includes deviating from Acemoglu et al.’s pre-speciﬁed rule of always using the earliest avail-
able mortality rate. Second, he argues that the mortality rates are sampled from very diﬀerent
populations such as bishops, soldiers stationed in barracks, or soldiers in campaign. These groups
had very diﬀerent living conditions, with very diﬀerent associated mortality rates even for the
same disease environment. Third, he points out the fact that Acemoglu et al. extrapolate many
mortality rates (28 of the 64 countries use original sources) and argues that this is done in an
arbitrary way.
Acemoglu et al. (2005) and (2006) answer each of his criticisms in detail. They conclude
that his revisions of the mortality rates "reﬂect a long list of mistakes on his part in coding and
selecting data" (Acemoglu et al. (2005), p. 39).
In this paper, I do not examine whether the original data was assembled in a "consistent"
manner, nor do I attempt to do this for the David Albouy’s revisions. Doing so would be somewhat
pointless, since there is not only disagreement on which mortality values to choose from within a
historical source such as Curtin (1998). In addition, one can ﬁnd multiple mortality rates across
historical sources. Given the very large supply of potential sources for historical mortality rates
one could come up with,2 it is always possible to construct a mortality series that either conﬁrms
or rejects the validity of Acemoglu et al.’s theory of colonial origins of comparative development.
The current paper is motivated by this fundamental problem when working with historical data
and the importance of Acemoglu et al. It is far from proven that Albouy’s concerns are justiﬁed;
however, the sheer importance of the "colonial origins" theory of comparative development for
the new comparative economics literature makes it worthwhile to establish the validity of this
theory in detail and beyond any level of doubt. For example, according to the social citation
index, of all articles published in the American Economic Review in the time of 2000 to 2002,
Acemoglu et al. ranks second in citations (237 up to February 2007). Moreover, the settler
mortality series is a prominent instrument for institutions and doubts about the quality of this
data also bring in question numerous other articles. For example, Easterly and Levine (2003) use
it to examine several competing theories of comparative development, while Rodrik et al. (2004)
use it to examine the eﬀect trade has on prosperity conditional on the quality of institutions.
2For example, neither Albouy nor Acemoglu et al. consult military archives for ﬁrst hand soldier mortality data,
nor do they search for newspaper sources that published mortality rates during colonialism.
3The contribution of this paper is to show that there is a straightforward solution to Albouy’s
criticisms: when in doubt about the endogeneity of a variable, economists try to ﬁnd instruments
for that variable. This paper instruments for the settler mortality rates with a geographic model
of the determinants of disease. Geography is measured precisely; is shown to be strongly related to
mortality; is also shown to be otherwise excludable to institutions; and is thus a valid instrument
for mortality. The methodology of this paper is related to the work of Anthony Kiszewski et
al. (2004), who instrument for the potentially endogenous level of malaria with a measure of the
geographic potential for the disease. Similarly, I construct several geographic projections of the
historical mortality estimates obtained by Acemoglu et al. and the ones obtained by Albouy.
When instrumenting for mortality with geography, I address all of the three criticisms brought
forward by Albouy. First, when constructing my i n s t r u m e n t sf o rm o r t a l i t y ,Io n l yr e l yo np r e -
cisely measured geographic information as instrumental variables such as average temperature
or monthly rainfall. Since all potential sources for these variables coincide, there is no room
for subjectivity or "inconsistencies" when constructing my instruments. Second, when estimat-
ing the relation between geography and disease, I also account for the diﬀerent populations the
mortality rates were sampled from. More speciﬁc, I include dummies for whether the data was
collected from soldiers during campaign, from forced laborers, or from bishops to the estimation
of the geographic model of mortality. I then predict this model, yet I partial out the eﬀect of the
population dummies. Hence, while the original data might be inﬂuenced by the population the
data was sampled from, my measure of the geographic potential of mortality is not. Third, when
estimating the relation between geography and mortality, I do not extrapolate certain mortality
rates, but I use the estimated relation between geography and mortality to instrument for the
countries with missing direct estimate of disease. That is, I do not extrapolate certain mortality
values to neighboring nations in an arbitrary way, but I argue that the relation between geography
and disease is the same in the countries with direct mortality estimates and in the rest of the
sample. Using this rule, I am able to instrument also for the extrapolated mortality rates in a
systematic and consistent way.
In addition to showing that my geographic instruments are relevant predictors of mortality, I
also establish the excludability of these instruments by a variety of robustness tests, additional
instruments for institutions and the associated overidentiﬁcation tests, and by an additional fal-
siﬁcation exercise.
In the falsiﬁcation exercise, I document that while the constructed measures of the geographic
4potential for mortality — that are very strong predictors of institutions in the sample of former
colonies — are not at all related to institutional outcomes in a sample of 60 nations that have not
been colonized. If the correlation between the geographic potential for mortality and institutions
is a result of the direct eﬀects disease environment has had on development, this eﬀect is present
in all countries equally. The latter is not the case, and I therefore conclude that the only chan-
nel through which early disease environment did inﬂuence institutional development was indirect
through European settlements and colonization policies.3 Summarizing, my instruments for set-
tler mortality are valid because they are strongly correlated with mortality rates and otherwise
excludable from the estimation because they inﬂuence property rights only indirectly through
settler mortality.
After constructing four measures of the geographic potential of disease (for each of the two
historical sources: a geographic projection of mortality and a geographic projection of mortality
adjusted for the population the rate was sampled from) and establishing their validity as instru-
ments, I repeat the analysis of Acemoglu et al. instrumenting for mortality with its geographic
projection. Overall, my results strongly support Acemoglu et al.’s hypothesis of the colonial ori-
gins of comparative development. First, I show that the relation between institutional outcomes
and the instrumented mortality rate is highly signiﬁcant in both the sample of Acemoglu et al. and
when using the data constructed by Albouy. The latter ﬁnding is robust to inclusion of controls
and to accounting for the population the historical data was collected from (bishops, from forced
labor or during campaign). While I ﬁnd that the population from which the historical mortality
estimate was sampled from does have a signiﬁcant impact on mortality rates,4 accounting for this
eﬀect does not change the relation between mortality and institutions. I conclude that the ﬁrst
stage results of Acemoglu et al. indeed do reﬂect their "early institution building" channel rather
than measurement error, as is asserted by Albouy.
3Although the identiﬁcation of the instrumental variable estimations requires that early disease environment
aﬀects development only through mortality and therefore institutions, the estimations do allow for direct eﬀects
of geography on development. Geography, measured by latitude, the potential for malaria, and numerous other
controls, is both a signiﬁcant and economically sizeable determinant of development also when the colonial origins
channel is accounted for.
4Moreover, the eﬀect the sampling population had on mortality rates is very large. For example, I estimate
(Table 1 Column 3) that conditional on the disease environment, soldiers in campaign are roughly three and a half
times as likely to die from disease than soldiers stationed in barracks.
5Second, I establish the eﬀect institutions have on income by using the constructed measures
of early disease environment to instrument for institutional outcomes. Not surprising given the
strong relationship between the potential for mortality and institutions, I ﬁnd very similar results
as do Acemoglu et al. For both mortality series and both in a statistical and economic sense,
institutions are a highly signiﬁcant determinant of economic prosperity.5 This result is again
shown to be robust to the inclusion of controls, to accounting for how the historical data was
collected, and also to including additional instruments for institutions.
A striking result of this paper is that while the relation between mortality and development is
very diﬀerent when using Albouy’s data as opposed to the one from Acemoglu et al., the relation
is nearly identical once I instrument for each of the two historical estimates of mortality. While
these two series diﬀer substantially, they are both aﬀected by geography in a very similar way.
Correspondingly, for both the results relating mortality to institutions and for the results relating
institutions to income, it does not matter which series is instrumented for.
Summarizing, my ﬁndings lead me to conclude that while collecting accurate mortality data
that originated several hundred years ago may be diﬃcult or nearly impossible, the proposed
method of instrumenting for the historical estimate with a geographic model of disease can deal
with these issues and can also allow to establish the validity of Acemoglu et al.’s theory of the
colonial origins of development. I also ﬁnd no evidence that their point estimates are biased by
measurement error that is correlated with economic outcomes.
The next section brieﬂy discusses Albouy’s three criticisms of the data constructed by Ace-
moglu et al. Section 3 presents the relation between geography and disease and section 4 constructs
and discusses the instruments for mortality. Section 5 presents the main result of this paper, the
relation between instrumented mortality and institutional outcomes. Next, section 6 establishes
that the instruments are indeed excludable by a falsiﬁcation exercise. Thereafter, I present the
results for the importance of institutions on income diﬀerentials in Section 7 and I establish the
robustness of these results in Section 8. I introduce further instruments for institutions and the
associated overidentiﬁcation tests in Section 9. Section 10 concludes.
5To quantify this statement, of the 160 (40 for each of the four measures of the geographic potential for mortality)
IV speciﬁcations estimated that relate income to institutions, I ﬁnd that the ﬁrst and second stage coeﬃcients of
interest are signiﬁcant at the 5% level in 159 instances, in 144 speciﬁcations they are signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
and in the majority of the cases they are signiﬁcant at far higher levels.
62 Albouy’s Critique
In this section, I brieﬂy list the three main criticisms brought forward by Albouy without taking
a position on the validity of these arguments. The interested reader is referred to Albouy’s note
and to Acemoglu et al. (2005) and (2006), who answer each of his criticisms in detail.
Albouy’s ﬁrst — and most controversial — criticism is that the data is measured inconsistently
when there are multiple possible mortality rates to choose from. Among other things, he argues
that Acemoglu et al. deviate from their pre-speciﬁed rule of always using the earliest available
mortality rate for a given country. For example, Albouy focuses on the case of Sudan. He claims
that Acemoglu et al. violate their pre-speciﬁed rule of always choosing the ﬁrst available mortality
rate. Acemoglu et al. (2006), in turn devote a full two pages to justify their choice of mortality
rate for Sudan, stating that their "actual coding rule was to take the ﬁrst peacetime number
where available" (p.19, emphasis added). Albouy’s discussion of single values is very detailed an
shall not be reproduced in this paper. However, it is important to note that Albouy’s main claim
is not that his data reﬂects the true mortality rates prevailing during colonialism better than
does the data of Acemoglu et al. Rather, his more general argument is that if one consistently
follows a pre-speciﬁed rule of how to pick mortality rates, the correlations between mortality and
institutions are much weaker than when working with the data of Acemoglu et al.6
Albouy’s second criticism concerns the comparability of the diﬀerent sources of mortality rates.
The true mortality rate for the average settler during colonization is not available and Acemoglu et
al. thus rely on mortality data collected from soldiers, bishops, and laborers. Albouy argues that
these populations had very diﬀerent living conditions, with very diﬀerent associated prevalence of
disease and consequently mortality rates even for the same disease environment. Moreover, for the
soldier mortality data from Curtin (1989), Acemoglu et al. sometimes use data collected during
a campaign, yet in other instances they use data collected from soldiers that were stationed in
barracks. Campaign mortality data were "66 to 2000 percent higher than barracks rates" (Albouy
(2006) p. 6). Hence, the results of Acemoglu et al. are biased if European powers had to ﬁght
relatively more campaigns in countries with worse initial and current institutions.
6This leads him to conclude that "it seems unlikely that a convincing set of settler mortality rates by country
c a ne v e rb ec o n s t r u c t e d "( p .1 7 ) .W h i l et h i sm a yb et r u ew h e n considering only historical sources, this paper shows
that one can construct such a series by exploiting the close link between mortality and geography.
7The third criticism concerns the way in which Acemoglu et al. extrapolate mortality rates to
neighboring countries. Albouy argues that the pattern of assigning mortality rates is "question-
able," that countries could have been assigned mortality data from various neighboring countries,
and that Acemoglu et al. present no clear criterion how they assign mortality rates to other
countries.7
Summarizing, Albouy claims that the original mortality data suﬀers from "a number of in-
consistencies, comparability problems and questionable geographic assignments" (abstract). He
then repeats the analysis of Acemoglu et al., with a very strong result: addressing any of his three
criticisms alone leads to a weak relation between settler mortality and institutions.
3 Geography and Mortality
If indeed the mortality data of Acemoglu et al. is measured with error, one needs instrumental
variables that are relevant predictors of mortality and otherwise excludable to institutions. This
section establishes that geography is a relevant predictor of mortality, and I later establish that
it is excludable, i.e. only related to institutional quality through settler mortality.
I instrument for the historical mortality series with geographic information such as average
temperature, average rainfall and a Mediterranean climate dummy. These variables are measured
precisely, have been constant throughout the last 300 years,8 and are strongly correlated with
germs and disease. While one might disagree on the details of how to collect data from historical
sources, the contribution of this paper is to use geographic variables that are measured precisely
and that therefore yield a unique projection of mortality. The procedure of instrumenting for the
observed level of a disease with the geographic potential for it is a standard instrumental variable
estimation. The methodology of this paper is related to Kiszewski et al. (2004), who instrument
for the potentially endogenous level of the prevalence of malaria with the geographic potential for
the disease. Their work has been applied by Sachs (2003) to argue that the geographic potential
for malaria has large eﬀects on economic development.
When constructing the geographic potential for settler mortality, I also address Albouy’s
"comparability problem." To make the mortality series comparable across the populations they
7Albouy also argues that even if the data was assigned correctly, the standard errors have to be adjusted for the
fact that there are only 36 diﬀerent mortality rates, which are assigned to 64 countries.
8Recent developments could raise doubts on whether all aspects of geography have indeed been constant through-
out modern history. Note, however, that for these instruments to be valid, it is only neccesarry that climate changes
are uncorrelated to early institutions set up during colonization.
8were sampled from, I simply add population dummies to the speciﬁcations, which control for the
fact that the data was sampled from soldiers stationed in barracks, from soldiers in campaign, from
bishops, or from forced laborers. Indeed, doing so improves the ﬁt of the estimation considerably.
In Table 1, I estimate the relationship between geography and mortality for the 64 countries
in the analysis of Acemoglu et al. (in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 1) and the 62 countries in the
analysis of Albouy (in Columns 4 to 6). When working with Albouy’s data, I focus on his revised
series "mort_a2." He also oﬀers a series titled "mort_a1," which is less revised than the mort_a2
series. The results presented in this paper do not depend on choosing either of his two mortality
series, but to point out that Albouy’s revisions are not important when instrumenting mortality
with geography, I use the series that diﬀers most from the data of Acemoglu et al.
In Column 1 of Table 1,9 I present a simple model of geography and mortality. The dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of the settler mortality rate collected by Acemoglu et al. Higher
average temperature is associated with higher levels of disease. The independent variables (from
Parker (1997)) are average annual temperature, minimum monthly rainfall, maximum monthly
rainfall and a Mediterranean climate dummy. For better comparability, all variables except the
dummies are standardized. For example, in the model of Column 1, the estimated coeﬃcient of
(standardized) average temperature is 0.46. The standard deviation of average annual tempera-
ture is 5.09,i m p l y i n gt h a ta1 degree Celsius warmer climate is associated with a 9% higher level of
mortality. I also evaluate the impact of rainfall and its seasonal variation. Areas with pronounced
dry (low minimum monthly rain) or wet seasons (high maximum monthly rain) are characterized
by high mortality rates. Mirroring this ﬁnding of low variation in climate being associated with
healthier living conditions, Mediterranean climate is associated with lower prevalence of disease.
How relevant are my instruments for mortality? Throughout Table 1, I report the p-value
corresponding to the joint null-hypothesis that these 4 geographic variables (average temperature,
minimum and maximum monthly rain, Mediterranean dummy) do not matter for mortality. I
reject the null hypothesis at the 1% signiﬁcance level in all regressions presented in Table 1, and
most of the time I also reject at far higher levels of signiﬁcance.
Is the selection of these four variables exhaustive? In Column 2, I add the standardized
distance from the equator and the standardized fraction of the population living in temperate
areas (KGPTEMP as is used in Sachs (2003)) to the estimation. Conditional on the information
9In all estimations presented in this paper, robust Huber/White/sandwich standard errors are reported in
brackets. Where applicable, the data is clustered.
9of the previous model, these two regressors are not signiﬁcant predictors of mortality and the
F-score of the model actually decreases substantially when including these two variables. I have
also added several other geographic controls, and except for the Malaria Ecology variable from
Kiszewski et al. (2004), these are not improving the ﬁt of the model of mortality. I do not include
Malaria Ecology in the speciﬁcations of Table 1, so that I can later test for the direct eﬀect malaria
has on income in the instrumental variables regressions presented below.
In Column 3, I address Albouy’s second major criticism: the data is collected from diﬀerent
populations, with very diﬀerent living conditions and diﬀerent mortality rates even for the same
disease environment. I thus add dummy variables to the estimation that equal one if the data was
collected from soldiers in a campaign, from forced laborers or from bishops respectively. Indeed,
the population the data was sampled from has a strong inﬂuence on mortality. Compared to the
omitted group — soldiers stationed in barracks — soldiers in a campaign are Exp[1.27] ≈ 3.5 times
as likely to die from disease, and this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. Also forced laborers are more likely
to die from disease (again by a large factor) while bishops faced a slightly lower mortality rate.
Accounting for Albouy’s argument that the sampling population has to be taken into account
improves the ﬁt of the model considerably and also changes the estimated coeﬃcients of the
geographic variables (compare Column 1 and 3).
In Columns 4 to 6, I repeat the analysis relating geography to mortality, yet I use Albouy’s
data as the dependent variable. The results mirror the previous ﬁndings. Average temperature,
minimum and maximum monthly rainfall, and a dummy for Mediterranean climate strongly
impact mortality (Column 4). The same cannot be said for latitude or KGPTEMP (Column 5)
and the F score of the model decreases when these two variables are added to the estimation.
In Column 5, only average temperature is signiﬁcant, but the joint signiﬁcance of regressors
1 to 4 is easily rejected at the 1% level. Dummy variables for data sources from campaigns,
forced laborers and bishops are not signiﬁcant by themselves (Column 6); however a joint test of
signiﬁcance cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
10(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Avg. temperature (standardized) 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.39
[0.12]** [0.14]** [0.12]** [0.15]** [0.17]* [0.12]**
Monthly rain (min, standardized) -0.52 -0.63 -0.24 -0.35 -0.4 -0.24
[0.09]** [0.18]** [0.11]* [0.11]** [0.23] [0.11]*
Monthly rain (max, standardized) 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.3 0.27 0.26
[0.10]* [0.12]* [0.10] [0.17] [0.17] [0.20]
Mediterranean climate dummy -1.09 -1.19 -0.89 -0.84 -0.75 -0.8
[0.32]** [0.35]** [0.27]** [0.36]* [0.51] [0.34]*
% pop. in temperate zones 0.3 0.28
(standardized) [0.20] [0.23]
Latitude (standardized) -0.27 -0.37
[0.16] [0.21]
Forced laborer dummy  1.16 -0.05
[0.28]** [0.23]
Bishop dummy -0.55 -0.22
[0.31] [0.37]
Campaign dummy 1.27 0.68
[0.33]** [0.35]
p-value regressors 1 to 4  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.003 <0.001
p-value population dummies - - <0.001 - - 0.017
No. of observations 64 60 64 62 58 62
No. of clusters 36 34 36 37 33 37
R-squared 53% 55% 65% 45% 47% 50%
from Acemoglu et al. 2001 from Albouy 2006 (Revision 2)
Dependent Variable is the Natural Logarithm of Mortality
Table 1 - Mortality and Geography
Sample of Acemoglu et al. Sample of Albouy
Notes: In Table 1, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of mortality, for Columns 1 to 3 from Acemoglu et al. and
for Columns 4 to 6 from Albouy, Revision 2; Forced Laborer, Bishops and Campaign dummies are taken from Albouy; 
KGPTEMP is not available for the Bahamas, Hong Kong, Malta, and Singapore; for other regressors see main text;
throughout Table 1, I report a p-value for the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients of Average temperature, Monthly
minimum and maximum rain and the Mediterranean dummy are equal to 0; where applicable I also report a p-value for the 
joint null hypothesis of the population dummies; clustered and robust standard errors reported in brackets; * significant at
5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
114 Measures of Early Disease Environment
In this section, I construct two geographic instruments for the mortality data of Acemoglu et al.
and two instruments for the data of Albouy.10 For each of Albouy’s and Acemoglu et al.’s series,
I ﬁrst create a geographic instrument for mortality and then a second one that also partials out
the inﬂuence the sampling population had on mortality rates. In this section, I also show that
the discrepancy between the data of Albouy and the one of Acemoglu et al. vanishes when the
proposed strategy of instrumenting with geography is employed.
The four variables of the geographic potential for disease correspond to the speciﬁcations of
Columns 1, 3, 4, and 6 of Table 1 presented in the previous section. Predicting the models of
Columns 1 and 3 that relate mortality to geography is straightforward. I denote the predicted
variable from Table 1, Column 1 by "DE AJR" (Disease Environment using Acemoglu Johnson
and Robinson) and the one from Column 3 by "DE Albouy." Each variable is simply the projection
matrix of the geographic variables on mortality, i.e. the geographic potential for disease. I do not
predict the models of Columns 2 and 5, but doing so would not lead to any diﬀerent conclusions
than presented below.
To address Albouy’s concern about the comparability of the mortality rates, I next predict
the models of Columns 3 and 6, yet I partial out the eﬀect the sampling population had on
mortality. For example, while soldiers in campaign were indeed more likely to die from disease
than soldiers stationed in barracks, the mortality of both groups was aﬀected by geography in
the same way. Thus, while there is no historical source that presents mortality rates from a
homogenous population, the geographic model can take into account the population that the
data was sampled from. I predict two measures that are adjusted for the population. "DE AJR
adjusted" refers to Column 3 that uses the 64 countries of Acemoglu et al. and adjusts for the
group dummies. Similarly, "DE Albouy adjusted" refers to Column 6 that uses the 62 countries
of Albouy and adjusts for the group dummies.11
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the two original and the four constructed measures
of disease and a pair-wise correlation diagram. The pair-wise correlation is calculated over 64
10The appendix lists the data created in this section, and also provides further graphs that compare the mortality
rates from historical sources to the constructed measures of early disease environment.
11Since soldiers stationed in barracks are the omitted group in the models of Column 3 and 6, I hence construct
a variable that measures the potential mortality of soldiers stationed in barracks for all countries of the sample.
Taking a diﬀerent population (for example Bishops) as the omitted group would only shift the constant in the
regressions presented below.
12or 62 observations. All variables correlate strongly and signiﬁcant far beyond the 1% level. The
correlation coeﬃcient between the original data from Albouy and Acemoglu et al. is equal to 0.861.
This is substantially lower than the correlation between the predicted measures of early disease.
The correlation between the two unadjusted measures of disease environment (DE AJR and DE
Albouy 2) is equal to 0.988 and the one between the two measures adjusted for population (DE
AJR adjusted and DE Albouy adjusted) equals 0.994. Since both mortality series are aﬀected by
geography in a similar way, the geographic projection of mortality is nearly identical when using
Albouy’s or Acemoglu et al.’s data.
To emphasize this point, Figure 1 plots the relations between the original data of Albouy and
Acemoglu et al. (Figure 1 A) and the relation between the two unadjusted measures of early
disease (Figure 1 B, The data is created from Columns 3 and 6 of Table 1). In Figure 1 A, all
countries where Albouy makes no revisions to the data of Acemoglu et al. lie on the 45 degree
line. Those that do not lie on the 45 degree line diﬀer between the data sets, and diﬀerences of two
log-points — roughly seven fold — are quite common. In contrast, the diﬀerences for the predicted
measure of early disease environment (Figure 1 B) are extremely small, and all observations lie
close to the 45 degree line. When instrumenting mortality with geography, the mortality series of
Acemoglu et al. and Albouy are nearly identical and thus the results of this study are invariant
to using either of the two data sets.
Summary Statistics
Series Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max
Ln Mortality AJR 64 4.65 1.25 2.15 7.99
DE AJR 64 4.65 0.91 2.31 6.78
DE AJR Adjusted 64 3.87 0.67 2.06 5.39
Ln Mortality Albouy (Rev. 2) 62 4.61 1.20 2.15 7.60
DE Albouy 62 4.61 0.81 2.52 6.87
DE Albouy Adjusted 62 4.23 0.70 2.41 6.18
Pairwise Correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. Ln Mortality AJR 1.000
2. DE AJR 0.726 1.000
3. DE AJR Adjusted 0.706 0.972 1.000
4. Ln Mortality Albouy (Rev. 2) 0.861 0.662 0.662 1.000
5. DE Albouy 0.719 0.988 0.987 0.671 1.000
6. DE Albouy Adjusted 0.706 0.969 0.994 0.666 0.994 1.000
Table 2 - Data Summary and Pairwise Correlation Diagram
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Notes: The upper Figure 1A presents a scatter plot of the original mortality rates from Acemoglu et al. versus the revised 
rates from Albouy, Revision 2. In this figure, since the mortality rates collected from historical sources are in some
cases extrapolated to neighboring nations, one hollow circle can represent multiple countries. The lower Figure 1B 
presents a scatter plot of the predicted disease environment using Acemoglu et al. versus the predicted disease 
environment using Albouy. In both figures the 45 degree line is displayed. In both figures, World Bank country codes 
are displayed if the respective two mortality rates (or disease environment estimates in 1B) differ by more than 0.3 log
points (35%). The two countries where disease environment (both measures) exceeds 6 are Sierra Leone and Guinea. 
 
145 Mortality and Institutions
In Tables 3.1 to 3.6, I report the main result of this paper. In all speciﬁcations, the instrumented
mortality rate is a highly signiﬁcant predictor of institutional quality. This result is the same
when using the data of either Acemoglu et al. (Tables 3.2-3.3) or the one of Albouy (Tables
3.4-3.6). This result is also robust to controlling for the population the data was sampled from
(Tables 3.2 and 3.6).
More speciﬁc, in Section 4, I construct four measures of early disease environment (for each of
the two mortality series: Disease Environment and Disease Environment adjusted for population
dummies). For each measure, I run 10 speciﬁcations using the robustness checks of Acemoglu
e ta l . O ft h et o t a lo f4 0s p e c i ﬁcations, I ﬁnd that instrumented mortality is signiﬁcant at the
1% level in all instances. In addition to showing that the qualitative results of Acemoglu et al.
are robust to instrumenting for the mortality data, I also do not ﬁnd any evidence that their
coeﬃcients are biased: the magnitude of their (ﬁrst stage) OLS coeﬃcient of mortality is actually
smaller than the magnitude of my (second stage) IV estimate for the instrumented mortality.
In Columns 1 to 8 in the Tables of this section, I repeat the robustness checks of Acemoglu
et al. (Columns 1 to 8 in their Table 4, Panel A on p. 1386).12 The dependent variable is the
average protection from expropriation during 1985 to 1995 from Knack and Keefer (1995). In
Columns 9 and 10, I provide an additional robustness check and use an alternative measure of
institutional quality, the score for the "Rule of Law" averaged over 1996 to 2004 from Kaufman
et al. (2005). In Tables 3.1 to 3.3, I use the settler mortality data collected by Acemoglu et al.
and in Tables 3.4 to 3.6 I use the one of Albouy.
In Column 1, I present the simple regression relating mortality (in Table 3.1 and 3.4 the original
mortality series; in the other tables the instrumented mortality rates) to institutional outcomes.
I add latitude in Column 2 and, following Acemoglu et al., I continue to always including latitude
in the following estimations as well, so that every even numbered column also controls for the
direct channels of geography captured by the distance from the equator.
In Columns 3 and 4, I exclude the "Neo-Europes" — Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
US — from the estimation. In Columns 5 and 6, I exclude African countries from the estimation.
In Columns 7 and 8, I add three continent dummies to the estimation. The latter are for Asia,
12Albouy presents similar robustness checks for various data revisions in his Table 2.
15for Africa and Other, so that the excluded category is the Americas. Finally, in Columns 9 and
10, I use my alternative measure of institutional quality as dependent variable, the score for rule
of law.
For convenience, in Tables 3.1 and 3.4, I repeat the ﬁrst stage analysis of Acemoglu et al. (3.1)
and Albouy (3.4),13 with the known result: while settler mortality seems to be a robust estimator
when using the original data, this is not the case for Albouy’s revised series. This discrepancy is
not a result of diﬀerent standard errors, but comes from the coeﬃcients of settler mortality being
systematically smaller in magnitude when using the data of Albouy.
The discrepancies between the two series nearly vanish when I instrument for mortality with
its geographic projection from Table 3.2 and 3.5 onwards. Because I instrument for mortality
with geography, the ﬁrst stage relation of Acemoglu et al.’s Table 4 is my second stage relation.
I report the results for my four diﬀerent projections of mortality.
In Tables 3.2 and 3.5, I report the results using the unadjusted measure of disease environment,
which is constructed in Column 1 (for Table 3.2) and Column 4 (for Table 3.5) of Table 1. It
should be noted that the regression in Column 1 of Panel B corresponds to a speciﬁcation where
mortality is instrumented with the four geographic variables used to construct the measure of
disease environment. For both variables (DE AJR and DE Albouy) and all robustness tests, the
instrumented mortality is a signiﬁcant predictor of institutions.
The other speciﬁcations in this section diﬀer from directly instrumenting with the geographic
variables since the projection is accounted for the population that the data was sampled from. In
Table 3.3 and 3.6, I report the results using the measure of disease environment that is adjusted
for population dummies. The latter variables are constructed from Table 1, Columns 3 and 6
respectively. Again, for both variables and all robustness tests, I conﬁrm the results of Acemoglu
et al. and this is also true when working with Albouy’s data.
The results of the speciﬁcations presented in this section strongly support the results of Ace-
moglu et al. Albouy argues that when taking into account any one of his criticisms, the relation
between mortality and institutions is substantially weakened. In contrast, in this paper, the rela-
tion between mortality and institutions is very strong even when all his criticisms are taken into
consideration.
13Note that throughout the paper, the latitude variable is standardized, which is not the case in Acemoglu et al.
Also, some of the results in my Table 3.1 diﬀer slightly (to two decimal places) from the results presented in Table
4 of Acemoglu et al. I use the data from their Table A2, which is rounded, hence explaining this discrepancy.
16(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln Mortality AJR -0.61 -0.52 -0.4 -0.4 -1.21 -1.14 -0.44 -0.35 -0.47 -0.38
[0.17]** [0.19]* [0.17]* [0.19]* [0.18]** [0.18]** [0.20]* [0.21] [0.10]** [0.11]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.27 -0.01 0.13 0.27 0.27
[0.19] [0.20] [0.15] [0.20] [0.12]*
Africa dummy -0.27 -0.26
[0.33] [0.31]
Asian dummy 0.33 0.47
[0.49] [0.53]
other cont. dummy 1.23 1.05
[0.84] [0.85]
p-value of mortality 0.001 0.011 0.025 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.108 0.000 0.002
p-value of other controls 0.174 0.952 0.392 0.397 0.341 0.024
No. of observations 64 64 60 60 37 37 64 64 64 64
No. of clusters 36 36 33 33 19 19 36 36 36 36
R-squared 0.27 0.3 0.13 0.13 0.47 0.47 0.31 0.33 0.44 0.51
Table 3.1 - OLS Estimates Using the Data of Acemoglu et al. 
Full Sample Full Sample
OLS Results for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa
Notes: Columns 1 to 8 of Table 3.1 reproduce Columns 1 to 8 of Table 4, Panel B of Acemoglu et al. (p. 1386). The dependent variable is the 1985 to 1995 average of the score for 
"Protection Against Expropriation Risk," which is measured from 0 to 10 with a higher score associated with better protection. In Columns 9 and 10, the dependent variable is the
1996 to 2004 average of the score of "Rule of Law." This variable is standardized and again, a higher score is associated with better property rights institutions. The mortality rates are 
from Acemoglu et al. ; Clustered and robust standard errors reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
17(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln Mortality AJR -0.97 -0.95 -0.7 -0.76 -1.77 -1.87 -1.09 -1.08 -0.68 -0.59
[0.19]** [0.22]** [0.21]** [0.23]** [0.27]** [0.34]** [0.27]** [0.31]** [0.10]** [0.15]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.02 -0.16 -0.11 0.02 0.15
[0.18] [0.19] [0.19] [0.19] [0.13]
Africa dummy 0.52 0.52
[0.47] [0.48]
Asian dummy 0.04 0.05
[0.43] [0.45]
other cont. dummy -0.01 -0.01
[0.77] [0.77]
p-value of mortality 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
p-value of other controls 0.916 0.388 0.553 0.705 0.816 0.234
DE AJR 1 0.92 0.95 0.9 0.68 0.62 0.76 0.71 1 1
[0.13]** [0.15]** [0.15]** [0.17]** [0.15]** [0.17]** [0.13]** [0.13]** [0.13]** [0.13]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.13 -0.16 -0.1 -0.1
[0.12] [0.15] [0.12] [0.09]
Africa dummy 0.68 0.66
[0.24]** [0.24]**
Asian dummy -0.64 -0.67
[0.24]* [0.23]**
other cont. dummy -1.01 -0.93
[0.21]** [0.21]**
No. of observations 64 64 60 60 37 37 64 64 64 64
No. of clusters 36 36 33 33 19 19 36 36 36 36
R-squared 0.53 0.54 0.41 0.43 0.5 0.52 0.68 0.68 0.53 0.53
Table 3.2 - IV Regressions for Institutional Outcomes Using DE AJR
Panel A: First Stage for Ln Mortality AJR
Full Sample Full Sample
Panel B: Second Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa
Notes: The instrumental variable estimations of Table 3.2 instrument for the estimate of settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. with DE AJR. Panel B presents the relation between 
instrumented mortality and institutional outcomes. Columns 1 to 8 reproduce Columns 1 to 8 of Table 4, Panel B of Acemoglu et al. (p. 1386). The dependent variable is the 1985 to
1995 average of the score for "Protection Against Expropriation Risk," which is measured from 0 to 10 with a higher score associated with better protection; In Columns 9 and 10, the 
dependent variable is the 1996 to 2004 average of the score for "Rule of Law." This variable is standardized and again, a higher score is associated with better property rights
institutions; Throughout the table, the p-value of mortality and the p-value of other controls is reported; Panel A presents the corresponding first stage relation between mortality and
disease environment. All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
18(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln Mortality AJR -0.91 -0.87 -0.61 -0.67 -1.74 -1.87 -0.98 -0.93 -0.64 -0.51
[0.19]** [0.22]** [0.19]** [0.22]** [0.30]** [0.39]** [0.26]** [0.28]** [0.11]** [0.15]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.07 -0.12 -0.11 0.07 0.19
[0.18] [0.19] [0.18] [0.18] [0.13]
Africa dummy 0.39 0.36
[0.43] [0.44]
Asian dummy 0.09 0.14
[0.42] [0.44]
other cont. dummy 0.2 0.2
[0.77] [0.76]
p-value of mortality 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
p-value of other controls 0.707 0.513 0.539 0.775 0.820 0.132
DE AJR Adjusted 1.33 1.26 1.26 1.21 0.86 0.8 1.06 1.04 1.33 1.26
[0.19]** [0.24]** [0.23]** [0.27]** [0.23]** [0.30]* [0.18]** [0.21]** [0.19]** [0.24]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08
[0.16] [0.18] [0.17] [0.10] [0.16]
Africa dummy 0.7 0.7
[0.22]** [0.23]**
Asian dummy -0.83 -0.83
[0.25]** [0.26]**
other cont. dummy -0.95 -0.94
[0.23]** [0.22]**
No. of observations 64 64 60 60 37 37 64 64 64 64
No. of clusters 36 36 33 33 19 19 36 36 36 36
R-squared 0.5 0.5 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.69 0.69 0.5 0.5
Table 3.3 - IV Regressions for Institutional Outcomes Using DE AJR Adjusted
Panel A: First Stage for Ln Mortality AJR
Full Sample Full Sample
Panel B: Second Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa
Notes: The instrumental variable estimations of Table 3.3 instrument for the estimate of settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. with DE AJR Adjusted. Panel B presents the relation 
between instrumented mortality and institutional outcomes. Columns 1 to 8 reproduce Columns 1 to 8 of Table 4, Panel B of Acemoglu et al. (p. 1386). The dependent variable is the 
1985 to 1995 average of the score for "Protection Against Expropriation Risk," which is measured from 0 to 10 with a higher score associated with better protection; In Columns 9 
and 10, the dependent variable is the 1996 to 2004 average of the score for "Rule of Law." This variable is standardized and again, a higher score is associated with better property
rights institutions; Throughout the table, the p-value of mortality and the p-value of other controls is reported; Panel A presents the corresponding first stage relation between
mortality and disease environment. All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
19(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln Mortality Albouy -0.42 -0.25 -0.13 -0.1 -1.06 -0.95 -0.13 0 -0.38 -0.25
[0.20]* [0.23] [0.19] [0.23] [0.27]** [0.30]** [0.22] [0.22] [0.10]** [0.12]
Latitude (standardized) 0.43 0.12 0.2 0.41 0.35
[0.24] [0.25] [0.17] [0.23] [0.14]*
Africa dummy -0.74 -0.68
[0.40] [0.33]*
Asian dummy 0.5 0.68
[0.51] [0.55]
other cont. dummy 1.83 1.53
[0.84]* [0.83]
p-value of mortality 0.045 0.291 0.508 0.660 0.001 0.005 0.553 0.988 0.001 0.051
p-value of other controls 0.082 0.646 0.276 0.040 0.016 0.017
No. of observations 62 62 58 58 37 37 62 62 62 62
No. of clusters 37 37 33 33 23 23 37 37 37 37
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 1 10 . 1 80 . 0 10 . 0 20 . 3 50 . 3 70 . 2 4 0 . 3 0 . 2 60 . 3 7
Table 3.4 - OLS Estimates Using the Data of Albouy, Revision 2
Full Sample Full Sample
OLS Results for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa
Notes: Columns 1 to 8 of Table 3.4 reproduce Columns 1 to 8 of Table 4, Panel B of Acemoglu et al.  (p. 1386) using the data of Albouy (Revision 2). The dependent variable is the 
1985 to 1995 average of the score for "Protection Against Expropriation Risk," which is measured from 0 to 10 with a higher score associated with better protection. In Columns 9 and
10, the dependent variable is the 1996 to 2004 average of the score of "Rule of Law." This variable is standardized and again, a higher score is associated with better property rights 
institutions. Clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
20(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln Mortality Albouy -1.02 -1.02 -0.71 -0.79 -1.71 -1.79 -1.03 -1.02 -0.73 -0.65
[0.24]** [0.28]** [0.24]** [0.28]** [0.24]** [0.35]** [0.28]** [0.36]** [0.13]** [0.18]**
Latitude (standardized) 0 -0.17 -0.08 0 0.12
[0.24] [0.25] [0.21] [0.26] [0.16]
Africa dummy 0.05 0.05
[0.50] [0.52]
Asian dummy 0.33 0.33
[0.50] [0.54]
other cont. dummy 0.18 0.18
[0.77] [0.77]
p-value of mortality 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
p-value of other controls 0.989 0.507 0.688 0.929 0.977 0.427
DE Albouy 1 0.89 0.92 0.86 0.81 0.76 0.84 0.75 1 1
[0.16]** [0.17]** [0.19]** [0.19]** [0.16]** [0.19]** [0.14]** [0.16]** [0.16]** [0.16]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.16 -0.15 -0.07 -0.14
[0.14] [0.17] [0.13] [0.12]
Africa dummy 0.3 0.31
[0.33] [0.33]
Asian dummy -0.51 -0.52
[0.27] [0.29]
other cont. dummy -1.02 -0.92
[0.27]** [0.25]**
No. of observations 62 62 58 58 37 37 62 62 62 62
No. of clusters 37 37 33 33 23 23 37 37 37 37
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 4 50 . 4 60 . 3 30 . 3 40 . 5 10 . 5 10 . 5 30 . 5 30 . 4 50 . 4 5
Table 3.5 - IV Regressions for Institutional Outcomes Using DE Albouy
Panel A: First Stage for Ln Mortality Albouy
Full Sample Full Sample
Panel B: Second Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa
Notes: The instrumental variable estimations of Table 3.5 instrument for the estimate of settler mortality from Albouy with DE Albouy. Panel B presents the relation between 
instrumented mortality and institutional outcomes. Columns 1 to 8 reproduce Columns 1 to 8 of Table 4, Panel B of Acemoglu et al. (p. 1386). The dependent variable is the 1985 to 
1995 average of the score for "Protection Against Expropriation Risk," which is measured from 0 to 10 with a higher score associated with better protection; In Columns 9 and 10, the 
dependent variable is the 1996 to 2004 average of the score for "Rule of Law." This variable is standardized and again, a higher score is associated with better property rights
institutions; Throughout the table, the p-value of mortality and the p-value of other controls is reported; Panel A presents the corresponding first stage relation between mortality and
disease environment. All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
21(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ln Mortality Albouy -0.98 -0.94 -0.64 -0.72 -1.67 -1.74 -0.96 -0.93 -0.71 -0.59
[0.24]** [0.28]** [0.22]** [0.27]** [0.25]** [0.38]** [0.27]** [0.35]** [0.13]** [0.18]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.05 -0.14 -0.07 0.04 0.15
[0.25] [0.26] [0.21] [0.26] [0.16]
Africa dummy -0.01 -0.02
[0.47] [0.50]
Asian dummy 0.34 0.37
[0.49] [0.53]
other cont. dummy 0.3 0.31
[0.77] [0.76]
p-value of mortality 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.001
p-value of other controls 0.850 0.587 0.742 0.907 0.966 0.325
DE Albouy Adjusted  1.14 1.03 1.05 0.99 0.9 0.85 0.97 0.89 1.14 1.14
[0.19]** [0.20]** [0.22]** [0.22]** [0.19]** [0.24]** [0.17]** [0.20]** [0.19]** [0.19]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.13 -0.11 -0.05 -0.1
[0.14] [0.17] [0.14] [0.12]
Africa dummy 0.33 0.33
[0.32] [0.32]
Asian dummy -0.58 -0.59
[0.29]* [0.30]
other cont. dummy -0.99 -0.92
[0.30]** [0.28]**
No. of observations 62 62 58 58 37 37 62 62 62 62
No. of clusters 37 37 33 33 23 23 37 37 37 37
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 4 40 . 4 50 . 3 30 . 3 30 . 4 70 . 4 80 . 5 30 . 5 40 . 4 40 . 4 4
Table 3.6 - IV Regressions for Institutional Outcomes Using DE Albouy Adjusted
Panel A: First Stage for Ln Mortality Albouy
Full Sample Full Sample
Panel B: Second Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa
Notes: The instrumental variable estimations of Table 3.6 instrument for the estimate of settler mortality from Albouy with DE Albouy Adjusted. Panel B presents the relation 
between instrumented mortality and institutional outcomes. Columns 1 to 8 reproduce Columns 1 to 8 of Table 4, Panel B of Acemoglu et al. (p. 1386). The dependent variable is the 
1985 to 1995 average of the score for "Protection Against Expropriation Risk," which is measured from 0 to 10 with a higher score associated with better protection; In Columns 9 
and 10, the dependent variable is the 1996 to 2004 average of the score for "Rule of Law." This variable is standardized and again, a higher score is associated with better property
rights institutions; Throughout the table, the p-value of mortality and the p-value of other controls is reported; Panel A presents the corresponding first stage relation between
mortality and disease environment; All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
226 Excludability of the Instrument - A Falsiﬁcation Exercise
Geography has been argued to have large direct eﬀects on income and development (see for
example Bloom and Sachs (1998), Gallup et al. (1998) and Diamond (1997)). To the same extent
as in the original article of Acemoglu et al., it could thus be the case that "[...] mortality rates of
settlers could be correlated with the current disease environment, which may have a direct eﬀect
on economic performance" (Acemoglu et al. (2001), p.1371).
To address the validity of their identifying assumption that settler mortality aﬀects develop-
ment only indirectly through institutions, Acemoglu et al. provide additional geographic controls
and further instruments for institutions.14 In addition to repeating the same checks, in this paper,
Ia ma b l et oo ﬀer an additional test of the direct eﬀects early disease environment may have had
on development.
In this section, I show that the measures of the geographic potential for mortality, which are
strong determinants of institutions in the sample of former colonies, have no explanatory power
in a sample of countries that have not been colonized.15 If the relationship between (instru-
mented) mortality and institutional outcomes indeed reﬂects the direct eﬀect geography has on
development, I should ﬁnd the same relation between early disease environment and institutional
outcomes irrespective of whether a country has been colonized or not. On the other side, if Ace-
moglu et al.’s theory is valid, disease environment should aﬀect development only in the sample
of former colonies, yet not in the rest of the sample.
I construct the measures of disease environment for a sample of 60 non-colonies. The countries
of this section are listed in Appendix 11.2 and have been selected on the basis of the following
criteria. They never have been colonized, never had the status of a protectorate, and they were not
subject to heavy slave trade. There are 36 countries that fullﬁll these requirements and have and
available score for average protection of expropriation and 60 countries that fullﬁl these criterias
and have an available score for rule of law.
For these 60 countries,16 I construct the four measures of disease environment using the coef-
ﬁcients of Table 1 (Column 1 for DE AJR, Column 3 for DE AJR Adjusted, Column 5 for DE
14See also the discussion of the direct eﬀects of disease environment on comparative development in Acemoglu et
al. (2003).
15For a discussion of falsiﬁcation exercises see Angrist and Krueger (1999)
16This sample includes some very small European nations, which might not be representative. Exclusion of An-
dora, Luxemburg, Monaco, and San Marino does not lead to a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of disease environment
for any of the speciﬁcations of Tables 4.1 to 4.4.
23Albouy, and Column 6 for DE Albouy Adjusted) and the geographic information from Parker
(1997), i.e. I simply predict the model relating geography and mortality out of sample.
Figures 2 and 3 display the basic result of this section. In Figure 2A, I present a scatter plot
between the predicted measure of disease environment (DE AJR) and average protection from
expropriation in the 36 countries of the non-colony sample. Figure 2B repeats this for the sample
of colonies in Acemoglu et al. While there is a clear downward relationship in the group of former
colonies, this is not the case in the rest of the sample. A simple regression conﬁrms this visual
impression. When I regress protection from expropriation on DE AJR in the sample of former
colonies, I ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative relation, and the corresponding R-squared is equal to 0.36.
On the contrary, when I repeat the same exercise and regress the protection from expropriation on
DE AJR (predicted out of sample) in the 36 countries that have not been colonized, the coeﬃcient
is not signiﬁcant at all, and the R-squared is substantially smaller than in the previous regression
(.06). The variable that is an extremely strong predictor in the sample of former colonies has no
power in the sample of non-colonized countries.
In Figure 3, I repeat this comparison of the relation between disease environment and institu-
tional outcomes using the score for rule of law. Again, there is a strong negative relation between
these two variables in the group of former colonies (3B), yet none in the group of non-colonies
(3A).
Quantifying this visual impression, I present the relation between my four measures of early
disease environment and institutional outcomes in the group of non-colonies in tables 4.1 to 4.4.
Again, the geographic potential of disease is predicted out of sample. The four measures of early
disease environment correspond to Columns 1, 3, 4, and 6 of Table 1. Since the sample size is
substantially larger, I ﬁrst focus on the score for the rule of law as the dependent variable.
In the simple regression of disease environment on the rule to law (Column 1 in Tables 4.1 to
4.4), the coeﬃcients of the respective measures of disease environment lie between -0.21 and -0.29
and are always insigniﬁcant. This is substantially smaller than the same relation in the group of
former colonies, where the coeﬃcients lie between -0.68 and -0.85 and are always signiﬁcant.17
Moreover, when I also control for latitude in Column 2, the coeﬃcients of disease environment
are actually positive in all instances (and not signiﬁcant). Again, this contrasts sharply with
17T h er e s p e c t i v ec o e ﬃcients are reported in Panel A of Tables 5.1 to 5.4, Column 9 (Column 9 of Table 5.1
corresponding to Column 1 of Table 4.1 etc.). The same information is also reported in Column 9 of Tables 3.2,
3.3, 3.5, and 3.6, where the total eﬀect of disease environment on institutions is equal to the product of the ﬁrst
stage coeﬃcient for disease environment on mortality and the second stage coeﬃcient of instrumented mortality on
rule of law.
24the relation between disease environment and institutions in the sample of former colonies (see
Column 10 in Panel A of Tables 5.1 to 5.4).
I next address the potential worry that the large number of countries that were under Russian
inﬂuence are solely responsible for this result and include a Warsaw Pact dummy to the estimation
in Column 3. While this dummy is signiﬁcantly negative, this does not aﬀect the coeﬃcients of
the measures of early disease environment. Also, it should be noted that the selection of countries
into the Warsaw Pact was probably not orthogonal to institutional quality, so that the negative
coeﬃcient of the Warsaw pact dummy may reﬂect either the negative impact of communism, or
the simple fact that countries with bad institutions in the early 19th century were more likely to
come under Russian inﬂuence.
In Column 4, I address another potential worry that a few Asian countries (for example Japan)
are driving the results in the sample of non-colonies. I thus include a dummy for Asian countries
and again ﬁnd that this is not the case: in Column 4 of Tables 5.1 to 5.4, the coeﬃcients for
early disease environment are again positive and insigniﬁcant. In the sample of this section,
there are only European and Asian countries and I could have therefore also included a dummy
for European countries with the same results as in Column 4, except for the sign of the dummy
coeﬃcient. Since the Asian dummy is equal to one for many former Soviet countries, in Column 5,
I include both the Warsaw Pact dummy and the Asian dummy to show that also when controlling
for both these factors, disease environment is not a determinant of institutions in former colonies.
In Columns 6 to 10, I repeat the same exercise using the 1985 to 1995 average score of
protection from expropriation as dependent variable. This measure is not available for many
transition economies and there are thus only 36 countries in this sample. The ﬁndings are very
comparable to using the rule of law as dependent variable: there is not a single case in which disease
environment is a signiﬁcantly negative determinant of institutions in the group of non-colonies,
and the coeﬃcients are substantially smaller than in the sample of former colonies (compare Table
4.1 to 4.2 to the Panel A of Tables 5.1 to 5.4, Columns 1 and 2). Furthermore, when I control for
latitude in Column 7, the coeﬃcients of disease environment are consistently positive and even
mildly signiﬁcant in one case (Table 4.2). Also when including the Warsaw Pact dummy (Column
8), a dummy for Asian countries (Column 9) or both (Column 10), the ﬁndings are similar to
using the score for rule of law as a dependent variable.
In stark contrast to the results in the sample of former colonies of Acemoglu et al., there is no
relation between disease environment and institutional outcomes in the sample of non-colonies. I
25conclude that my geographic instruments for settler mortality are excludable because they only
inﬂuence institutional development in former colonies, which can only be explained by the early
institution building eﬀect mortality rates had in the process of colonization.
26Figure 2 - The Differential Effect Disease Environment had on Protection from Expropriation
Notes: Figure 2 presents the relation between Early Disease Environment (DE AJR) and the 1985 to 1995 average of the
score for Protection Against Expropriation Risk. The upper Figure 2A presents a scatter plot of these variables in 36
countries that have not been colonized. The lower Figure 2B presents the same relation for the sample of former
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2B: Disease and Expropriation in Former Colonies
27Figure 3: The Differential Effect Disease Environment had on Rule of Law
Notes: Figure 3 presents the relation between Early Disease Environment (DE AJR) and the 1996 to 2004 average of the 
score for Rule of Law. The upper Figure 3A presents a scatter plot of these variables in 60 countries that were not 
colonized, have not been under the status of a protectorate and were not subject to heavy slave trade. The lower Figure 
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3B: Disease and Rule of Law in Former Colonies
28(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DE AJR -0.29 0.24 -0.28 0.24 0.2 -0.43 0.58 -0.49 0.07 0.02
[0.18] [0.26] [0.18] [0.22] [0.20] [0.33] [0.48] [0.37] [0.36] [0.41]
Latitude (standardized) 0.06 0.08
[0.02]** [0.03]**
Warsaw Pact dummy -1.27 -1.19 -0.55 -0.67
[0.21]** [0.20]** [0.43] [0.43]
Asia dummy -1.32 -1.19 -1.28 -1.35
[0.33]** [0.26]** [0.52]* [0.56]*
P-value DE AJR  0.116 0.357 0.132 0.269 0.321 0.21 0.241 0.197 0.852 0.967
No. of observations 60 60 60 60 60 36 36 36 36 36
R-squared 0.03 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.51 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.21 0.26
Table 4.1 - DE AJR and Institutions in not Colonized Nations
Sample of not colonized countries
Dependent Variable is: the Rule of Law Average Protection from Expropriation
Notes: Table 4.1 presents the relation between the disease environment (DE AJR) and institutional outcomes in a sample of countries that were not
colonized, have not been under the status of a protectorate, and were not subject to heavy slave trade. DE AJR is constructed using the coefficients from 
Column 1 of Table 1 and the respective geographic information from Parker (1997). The Warsaw Pact dummy is one if a country was a member of the
Warsaw Pact. The sample includes only European and Asian countries, thus the excluded category for the Asia dummy is Europe. Robust standard errors 
reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DE AJR Adjusted -0.21 0.62 -0.24 0.45 0.34 -0.36 1.16 -0.44 0.25 0.18
[0.22] [0.32] [0.22] [0.26] [0.24] [0.39] [0.46]* [0.44] [0.41] [0.47]
Latitude (standardized) 0.07 0.1
[0.02]** [0.02]**
Warsaw Pact dummy -1.28 -1.17 -0.52 -0.64
[0.22]** [0.21]** [0.43] [0.44]
Asia dummy -1.39 -1.23 -1.38 -1.44
[0.31]** [0.25]** [0.49]** [0.54]*
P-value DE AJR Adj. 0.328 0.059 0.272 0.089 0.168 0.367 0.017 0.323 0.543 0.708
No. of observations 60 60 60 60 60 36 36 36 36 36
R-squared 0.01 0.19 0.33 0.26 0.52 0.03 0.31 0.06 0.22 0.27
Table 4.2 - DE AJR Adjusted and Institutions in not Colonized Nations
Sample of not colonized countries
Dependent Variable is: the Rule of Law Average Protection from Expropriation
Notes: Table 4.2 presents the relation between the disease environment (DE AJR Adjusted) and institutional outcomes in a sample of countries that were 
not colonized, have not been under the status of a protectorate, and were not subject to heavy slave trade. DE AJR Adjusted is constructed using the 
coefficients from Column 3 of Table 1 and the respective geographic information from Parker (1997). The Warsaw Pact dummy is one if a country was a
member of the Warsaw Pact. The sample includes only European and Asian countries, thus the excluded category for the Asia dummy is Europe. Robust 
standard errors reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
29(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DE Albouy -0.27 0.55 -0.32 0.33 0.2 -0.47 0.92 -0.55 0.08 0.01
[0.20] [0.31] [0.20] [0.23] [0.22] [0.34] [0.51] [0.39] [0.35] [0.41]
Latitude (standardized) 0.07 0.09
[0.02]** [0.03]**
Warsaw Pact dummy -1.3 -1.18 -0.56 -0.67
[0.22]** [0.21]** [0.42] [0.43]
Asia dummy -1.35 -1.16 -1.28 -1.34
[0.30]** [0.25]** [0.49]* [0.53]*
P-value DE Albouy 0.182 0.082 0.113 0.151 0.365 0.181 0.079 0.165 0.831 0.986
No. of observations 60 60 60 60 60 36 36 36 36 36
R-squared 0.03 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.51 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.21 0.26
Table 4.3 - DE Albouy and Institutions in not Colonized Nations
Sample of not colonized countries
Dependent Variable is: the Rule of Law Average Protection from Expropriation
Notes: Table 4.3 presents the relation between the disease environment (DE Albouy) and institutional outcomes in a sample of countries that were not 
colonized, have not been under the status of a protectorate, and were not subject to heavy slave trade. DE Albouy is constructed using the coefficients from 
Column 4 of Table 1 and the respective geographic information from Parker (1997). The Warsaw Pact dummy is one if a country was a member of the
Warsaw Pact. The sample includes only European and Asian countries, thus the excluded category for the Asia dummy is Europe. Robust standard errors 
reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
DE AJR -0.29 0.24 -0.28 0.24 0.2 -0.43 0.58 -0.49 0.07 0.02
[0.18] [0.26] [0.18] [0.22] [0.20] [0.33] [0.48] [0.37] [0.36] [0.41]
Latitude (standardized) 0.06 0.08
[0.02]** [0.03]**
Warsaw Pact dummy -1.27 -1.19 -0.55 -0.67
[0.21]** [0.20]** [0.43] [0.43]
Asia dummy -1.32 -1.19 -1.28 -1.35
[0.33]** [0.26]** [0.52]* [0.56]*
P-value DE Albouy Adj. 0.309 0.036 0.198 0.083 0.229 0.277 0.022 0.245 0.614 0.789
No. of observations 60 60 60 60 60 36 36 36 36 36
R-squared 0.03 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.51 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.21 0.26
Table 4.4 - DE Albouy Adjusted and Institutions in not Colonized Nations
Sample of not colonized countries
Dependent Variable is: the Rule of Law Average Protection from Expropriation
Notes: Table 4.4 presents the relation between the disease environment (DE Albouy Adjusted) and institutional outcomes in a sample of countries that were 
not colonized, have not been under the status of a protectorate, and were not subject to heavy slave trade. DE Albouy Adjusted is constructed using the 
coefficients from Column 6 of Table 1 and the respective geographic information from Parker (1997). The Warsaw Pact dummy is one if a country was a
member of the Warsaw Pact. The sample includes only European and Asian countries, thus the excluded category for the Asia dummy is Europe. Robust 
standard errors reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
307 Income and Institutions
The previous sections establish that the four measures of disease environment are relevant instru-
ments for mortality. In this section, I disentangle the relationship between institutions and income.
Overall, my results show that (instrumented) institutions are highly signiﬁcant determinants of
international income diﬀerentials. In all speciﬁcations, the ﬁrst stage relation between disease
environment and institutions is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and in 34 of 40 speciﬁcations, it is also
signiﬁcant at the 1% level or higher. The second stage coeﬃcient of instrumented institutions is
highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
In the regressions presented in the tables of this section (Tables 5.1 to 5.4), I directly instrument
for institutions with the constructed measures of early disease environment. When Acemoglu et
al. use mortality as an instrument for institutions, they implicitly test the joint hypothesis
that mortality rates inﬂuenced the size of European settlements and that European settlements
inﬂuenced early institutions. I test the joint hypothesis that geography inﬂuenced mortality rates,
that mortality rates inﬂuenced the size of European settlements, and that European settlements
inﬂuenced early institutions.
Tables 5.1 to 5.4 repeat the speciﬁcations of Table 3.1 to 3.6, which are also the one’s of Table
4 in Acemoglu et al. In Column 1, I present the simple IV estimation using disease environment to
instrument for institutions. I add latitude in Column 2 and I continue to always including latitude
in the following estimations as well, so that every even numbered column also controls for the
direct channels of geography captured by the distance from the equator. In Columns 3 and 4, I
exclude the "Neo-Europes" from the estimation. In Columns 5 and 6, I exclude African countries
from the estimation. In Columns 7 and 8, I add three continent dummies to the estimation (Asia,
for Africa and Other). Finally, in Columns 9 and 10, I use the alternative measure of institutional
quality, the score for rule of law, as dependent the variable.
In Table 5.1, I present the results when instrumenting for institutions with the unadjusted
measure of disease environment, DE AJR. In all speciﬁcations, both the ﬁrst and second stage
results relating disease environment to institutions and institutions to income diﬀerences are
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The same is true when using DE AJR Adjusted as an instrument
(Table 5.2), when using DE Albouy (Table 5.3) or De Albouy Adjusted (Table 5.4).
The 6 out of 40 instances where I ﬁnd lower signiﬁcance of the ﬁrst stage relation are in Column
10 of Table 5.2, in Column 4 in Table 5.2, 5.3. and 5.4 and Column 8 of Table 5.3 and 5.4. In
31Column 4 in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, I have controlled for latitude and excluded the Neo-Europes.
In Column 8 of Tables 5.3 and 5.4 I have also controlled for latitude and included continent
dummies. In Column 10 of Table 5.2, I have only controlled for latitude, and the regression uses
the score for rule of law as dependent variable. The second stage coeﬃcient of institutions is
signiﬁcant in every one of the 40 estimated speciﬁcations.
What about the associated importance of institutions for prosperity? Compare, for example,
the results of Acemoglu et al.’s most basic speciﬁcation (their Table 4, Column 1) to the results
obtained here. In Table 4 of Acemoglu et al., a one percent higher mortality is associated with
a 0.61 percentage points lower score of rule of law (their Panel B). This in turn is associated
with a 0.57 (=0.94*0.61) percent lower level of income. In the corresponding speciﬁcation (in my
Table 5.1, Column 1) of this paper, a one percentage point lower score of disease environment is
associated with a 0.97 percentage point decrease of the score for protection from expropriation
and a 0.72 percent income diﬀerence.
Incorporating that the variability of DE AJR (standard deviation equal to 0.91) is smaller
than the one of the logarithm of mortality of Acemoglu et al. (standard deviation equal to 1.25),
I ﬁnd that in these two speciﬁcations a one standard deviation income is associated with a 0.713
(Acemoglu et al.) and 0.655 (my Table 5.1, Column 1) diﬀerence in the logarithm of income
respectively. Moreover, when again evaluating the quantitative impact of institutions, but using
the measure of disease environment obtained from Albouy (DE Albouy) in Column 1 of Table
5.3, again the point estimate is very similar. One standard deviation diﬀerence in DE Albouy is
associated with a 0.735 (1.02*0.89*0.81) higher log income. Thus, I conclude that my results do
not only conﬁrm the colonial origins theory qualitatively, but they also lead to point estimates
that are very similar to the ones of Acemoglu et al. and this is even true when using the data of
Albouy.
32( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )( 9 ) ( 1 0 )
Protection against expro- 0.85 0.86 1.13 1.06 0.66 0.68 0.74 0.75
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.13]** [0.15]** [0.27]** [0.24]** [0.10]** [0.11]** [0.13]** [0.15]**
Rule of law 1.22 1.38
[0.15]** [0.29]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.01 0.15 -0.05 -0.02 -0.2
[0.12] [0.15] [0.08] [0.11] [0.18]
Africa dummy -0.66 -0.66
[0.21]** [0.21]**
Asian dummy -0.8 -0.81
[0.27]** [0.29]**
Other continent dummy -0.43 -0.43
[0.52] [0.52]
DE AJR -0.97 -0.88 -0.67 -0.68 -1.2 -1.15 -0.82 -0.76 -0.68 -0.55
[0.20]** [0.23]** [0.21]** [0.23]** [0.18]** [0.21]** [0.20]** [0.22]** [0.12]** [0.16]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.15 -0.04 0.08 0.13 0.23
[0.17] [0.19] [0.15] [0.15] [0.13]
Africa dummy -0.21 -0.2
[0.27] [0.27]
Asian dummy 0.74 0.78
[0.38] [0.40]
Other continent dummy 1.08 0.98
[0.58] [0.60]
Observations 64 64 60 60 37 37 64 64 64 64
Clusters 36 36 33 33 19 19 36 36 36 36
R-squared (1st stage) 0.36 0.36 0.17 0.17 0.5 0.5 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.52
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Table 5.1 - IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita for DE AJR
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa Full Sample Full Sample
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the
corresponding first stage. All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
33( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )( 9 ) ( 1 0 )
Protection against expro- 0.87 0.89 1.22 1.12 0.68 0.72 0.74 0.75
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.15]** [0.18]** [0.29]** [0.29]** [0.11]** [0.12]** [0.14]** [0.16]**
Rule of law 1.24 1.5
[0.17]** [0.38]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.03 0.14 -0.07 -0.02 -0.26
[0.14] [0.17] [0.09] [0.11] [0.23]
Africa dummy -0.66 -0.66
[0.21]** [0.22]**
Asian dummy -0.79 -0.81
[0.27]** [0.29]**
Other continent dummy -0.43 -0.43
[0.53] [0.54]
DE AJR Adjusted -1.21 -1.09 -0.77 -0.81 -1.51 -1.49 -1.04 -0.96 -0.85 -0.65
[0.27]** [0.34]** [0.23]** [0.31]* [0.30]** [0.45]** [0.28]** [0.32]** [0.17]** [0.24]*
Latitude (standardized) 0.13 -0.07 0.01 0.09 0.23
[0.21] [0.23] [0.26] [0.18] [0.16]
Africa dummy -0.3 -0.29
[0.29] [0.28]
Asian dummy 0.9 0.91
[0.44]* [0.46]
Other continent dummy 1.13 1.07
[0.67] [0.68]
Observations 64 64 60 60 37 37 64 64 64 64
Clusters 36 36 33 33 19 19 36 36 36 36
R-squared (1st stage) 0.3 0.31 0.12 0.12 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.4 0.4 0.44
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Table 5.2 - IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita for DE AJR Adjusted
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa Full Sample Full Sample
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the
corresponding first stage. All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
34( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )( 9 ) ( 1 0 )
Protection against expro- 0.89 0.96 1.27 1.22 0.67 0.7 0.79 0.85
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.15]** [0.19]** [0.32]** [0.32]** [0.10]** [0.11]** [0.16]** [0.20]**
Rule of law 1.24 1.52
[0.14]** [0.33]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.11 0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.3
[0.14] [0.17] [0.08] [0.12] [0.21]
Africa dummy -0.54 -0.52
[0.21]* [0.24]*
Asian dummy -0.82 -0.89
[0.28]** [0.32]**
Other continent dummy -0.53 -0.55
[0.56] [0.60]
DE Albouy -1.02 -0.91 -0.65 -0.68 -1.38 -1.35 -0.86 -0.77 -0.73 -0.58
[0.25]** [0.30]** [0.23]** [0.27]* [0.23]** [0.31]** [0.27]** [0.30]* [0.14]** [0.19]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.16 -0.05 0.03 0.14 0.23
[0.19] [0.21] [0.19] [0.19] [0.14]
Africa dummy -0.26 -0.26
[0.31] [0.31]
Asian dummy 0.85 0.87
[0.39]* [0.42]*
Other continent dummy 1.23 1.13
[0.61] [0.62]
Observations 62 62 58 58 37 37 62 62 62 62
Clusters 37 37 33 33 23 23 37 37 37 37
R-squared (1st stage) 0.31 0.31 0.13 0.13 0.46 0.46 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.46
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Table 5.3 - IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita for DE Albouy
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa Full Sample Full Sample
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the
corresponding first stage. All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
35( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )( 9 ) ( 1 0 )
Protection against expro- 0.91 1.01 1.34 1.29 0.68 0.73 0.8 0.88
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.16]** [0.22]** [0.35]** [0.36]** [0.10]** [0.11]** [0.17]** [0.22]**
Rule of law 1.26 1.61
[0.15]** [0.39]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.14 0.06 -0.07 -0.1 -0.34
[0.16] [0.19] [0.08] [0.13] [0.24]
Africa dummy -0.53 -0.5
[0.22]* [0.25]*
Asian dummy -0.83 -0.91
[0.28]** [0.33]**
Other continent dummy -0.56 -0.6
[0.57] [0.64]
DE Albouy Adjusted -1.12 -0.97 -0.68 -0.71 -1.5 -1.48 -0.93 -0.83 -0.81 -0.61
[0.28]** [0.34]** [0.23]** [0.30]* [0.29]** [0.43]** [0.31]** [0.35]* [0.16]** [0.22]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.17 -0.06 0.02 0.14 0.23
[0.21] [0.23] [0.24] [0.20] [0.15]
Africa dummy -0.32 -0.32
[0.31] [0.31]
Asian dummy 0.9 0.91
[0.42]* [0.45]*
Other continent dummy 1.25 1.16
[0.66] [0.66]
Observations 62 62 58 58 37 37 62 62 62 62
Clusters 37 37 33 33 23 23 37 37 37 37
R-squared (1st stage) 0.28 0.28 0.1 0.1 0.42 0.42 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.43
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk for Rule of Law
Table 5.4 - IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita for DE Albouy Adjusted
Full Sample w/o Neo Europe w/o Africa Full Sample Full Sample
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the
corresponding first stage. All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
368 Robustness Tests
In the 8 tables of this section, I provide additional evidence that the results presented so far are
robust to the inclusion of further geographic, sociological and economic controls. In all the 80
additional robustness tests, the instruments for institutions as well as instrumented institutions
themselves are signiﬁcant. In Tables 6.1 to 6.4, I present the robustness tests of Table 5 of Ace-
moglu et al. Again, this is done for my 4 measures of disease environment constructed from Table
1. In Tables 7.1 to 7.4, I present further robustness tests adding geographic and socioeconomic
controls.
I nT a b l e s6 . 1t o6 . 4 ,Iﬁrst include dummies for British and French colonies from La Porta
et al. (1999) and (1998). Again, to control for the direct eﬀects of geography, this is done with
(Column 1) and without (Column 2) adding latitude to the estimation. I ﬁnd that the colony
dummies signiﬁcantly inﬂuence on development, yet that they inﬂuence institutions (ﬁrst stage)
and income directly (second stage) in opposing ways. To check that the colonial origins theory
of Acemoglu et. al. is also valid within the groups of former British colonies, Columns 3 and
4 restrict the sample to the 23 former British colonies. In the next two speciﬁcations, I include
a French legal origin dummy, which is again signiﬁcantly negative in the ﬁrst and signiﬁcantly
positive in the second stage. Combining the two eﬀects, French legal origins are on average
associated with a very small eﬀe c to ni n c o m e . T h es a m eﬁnding of two counteracting eﬀects
in the ﬁrst and the second stage is true when testing for religion (Column 7 and 8 that add the
percentage of the population of Catholic and the percentage of the population of Muslim believes)
or including a French colony dummy and a French legal origin dummy at the same time (Column
9 and 10). However, regardless of which measure I control for, the ﬁrst stage coeﬃcient of disease
environment is signiﬁcant and instrumented institutions are a signiﬁcant determinant of economic
prosperity.
In Tables 7.1 to 7.4, I include further geographic and sociological controls. I ﬁrst include the
Geographic potential for mortality, Malaria Ecology, from Kiszewski et al. (2004) in Column
1 and 2. Higher potential for malaria is associated with both worse institutional outcomes and
lower income directly, but neither eﬀect is signiﬁcant. Combining ﬁrst and second stage eﬀects and
incorporating the fact that within the sample of Acemoglu et al., the standard deviation of Malaria
Ecology is 8.43, a one standard deviation diﬀerence in this measure leads to a diﬀerence in log
income of 0.2. A dummy for landlocked countries (Column 3 and 4) is signiﬁcantly detrimental for
37institutional outcomes. Incorporating also the insigniﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient in the second
stage, being landlocked is associated (in Table 7.1, Column 3) with a 0.62 log points lower in
income per capita, which is quite substantial. Next, in Column 5 and 6, I add an oil dummy
that equals 1 if proven oil reserves are larger than 500,000 Barrels per capita. This is the case in
Gabon, Mexico, and Venezuela. (The large oil reserves of Canada are not accounted for in Parker
(1997)). Not surprising, oil rich countries are on average richer. More surprisingly, in the sample
examined here, this eﬀect seems to work through institutions rather than directly.
In the last four columns of Tables 7.1 to 7.4, I control for the three measures of Ethnic (Column
6), Linguistic (7), and Religious (8) Fractionalization from Alesina et al. (2003). Following the
pioneering work of Mauro (1995), low scores for these measures (low scores imply homogenous
countries) are thought to ease collaboration between groups and individuals in a country, and
thereby improve institutional outcomes. I do ﬁnd some support for this view only when I include
all three measures of fractionalization at the same time (Column 10), and I also do ﬁnd that only
ethnic fractionalization has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on institutions. I also ﬁnd in both Column 8
and 10 that linguistic fractionalization has negative direct eﬀects on income levels.
38(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Protection against expro- 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.79 0.75 0.93 0.95
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.14]** [0.17]** [0.14]** [0.20]** [0.13]** [0.16]** [0.09]** [0.12]** [0.14]** [0.18]**
Latitude (standardized) 0 -0.13 -0.02 0.06 -0.03
[0.11] [0.14] [0.11] [0.12] [0.12]
Bristish colony dummy -0.55 -0.55
[0.29] [0.30]
French colony dummy 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06
[0.32] [0.34] [0.26] [0.30]
French legal origin dummy 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.76
[0.28]** [0.30]* [0.26]** [0.29]**
% of population Muslim 0.003 0.002
[0.004] [0.004]
% of population Catholic 0.013 0.012
[0.003]** [0.004]**
DE AJR -0.86 -0.76 -1.08 -0.93 -0.9 -0.82 -0.96 -0.84 -0.86 -0.75
[0.17]** [0.20]** [0.21]** [0.30]** [0.17]** [0.20]** [0.17]** [0.21]** [0.18]** [0.21]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.16 0.26 0.15 0.18 0.19
[0.15] [0.19] [0.15] [0.16] [0.16]
Bristish colony dummy 0.7 0.67
[0.30]* [0.29]*
French colony dummy -0.51 -0.58 -0.6 -0.67
[0.35] [0.37] [0.31] [0.32]*
French legal origin dummy -0.71 -0.71 -0.57 -0.56
[0.32]* [0.31]* [0.32] [0.31]
% of population Muslim -0.007 -0.009
[0.005] [0.006]
% of population Catholic -0.011 -0.012
[0.004]* [0.004]**
Observations 64 64 23 23 64 64 64 64 64 64
Clusters 36 36 19 19 36 36 36 36 36 36
R-squared (1st stage) 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.5 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.45
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 6.1 - IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita with Additional Controls for DE AJR
Full Sample British Colonies Full Sample
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the
corresponding first stage. The omitted group in Columns 1 and 2 is all countries that were neither French nor British colonies. All specifications are estimated using Stata's 
ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
39(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Protection against expro- 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.9 0.91 0.92 0.78 0.7 0.92 0.93
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.15]** [0.18]** [0.13]** [0.20]** [0.13]** [0.17]** [0.09]** [0.14]** [0.14]** [0.19]**
Latitude (standardized) 0 -0.12 -0.01 0.09 -0.02
[0.12] [0.14] [0.11] [0.13] [0.12]
Bristish colony dummy -0.55 -0.55
[0.28] [0.31]
French colony dummy 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05
[0.31] [0.33] [0.26] [0.29]
French legal origin dummy 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.75
[0.27]** [0.29]* [0.26]** [0.28]**
% of population Muslim 0.003 0.001
[0.004] [0.004]
% of population Catholic 0.013 0.012
[0.003]** [0.003]**
DE AJR Adjusted -1.1 -0.98 -1.54 -1.42 -1.15 -1.05 -1.23 -1.07 -1.1 -0.94
[0.22]** [0.29]** [0.26]** [0.50]* [0.22]** [0.29]** [0.23]** [0.31]** [0.23]** [0.30]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.17
[0.19] [0.29] [0.18] [0.21] [0.19]
Bristish colony dummy 0.84 0.8
[0.32]* [0.32]*
French colony dummy -0.48 -0.54 -0.59 -0.65
[0.35] [0.38] [0.30] [0.31]*
French legal origin dummy -0.84 -0.84 -0.71 -0.68
[0.33]* [0.33]* [0.34]* [0.34]*
% of population Muslim -0.01 -0.012
[0.006] [0.006]*
% of population Catholic -0.014 -0.014
[0.005]** [0.005]**
Observations 64 64 23 23 64 64 64 64 64 64
Clusters 36 36 19 19 36 36 36 36 36 36
R-squared (1st stage) 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.47 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.4 0.41
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 6.2 - IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita with Additional Controls for DE AJR Adjusted
Full Sample British Colonies Full Sample
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the
corresponding first stage. The omitted group in Columns 1 and 2 is all countries that were neither French nor British colonies. All specifications are estimated using Stata's 
ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
40(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Protection against expro- 0.93 0.98 0.86 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.79 0.79 0.94 1.01
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.15]** [0.20]** [0.14]** [0.21]** [0.14]** [0.18]** [0.10]** [0.14]** [0.15]** [0.21]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.07 -0.17 -0.08 0.00 -0.09
[0.13] [0.15] [0.12] [0.12] [0.13]
Bristish colony dummy -0.64 -0.66
[0.29]* [0.32]*
French colony dummy 0 0.06 0.05 0.12
[0.30] [0.35] [0.27] [0.33]
French legal origin dummy 0.71 0.74 0.7 0.73
[0.28]* [0.32]* [0.27]** [0.31]*
% of population Muslim 0.003 0.003
[0.004] [0.005]
% of population Catholic 0.012 0.012
[0.003]** [0.004]**
DE Albouy -0.92 -0.82 -1.26 -1.16 -0.96 -0.88 -1.04 -0.9 -0.92 -0.8
[0.21]** [0.26]** [0.23]** [0.37]** [0.21]** [0.26]** [0.22]** [0.27]** [0.21]** [0.26]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.17
[0.18] [0.23] [0.16] [0.19] [0.17]
Bristish colony dummy 0.88 0.83
[0.31]** [0.30]**
French colony dummy -0.49 -0.55 -0.62 -0.68
[0.36] [0.38] [0.31] [0.33]*
French legal origin dummy -0.87 -0.85 -0.73 -0.69
[0.31]** [0.31]** [0.34]* [0.33]*
% of population Muslim -0.01 -0.011
[0.006] [0.006]
% of population Catholic -0.014 -0.014
[0.004]** [0.004]**
Observations 62 62 22 22 62 62 62 62 62 62
Clusters 37 37 21 21 37 37 37 37 37 37
R-squared (1st stage) 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.42
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 6.3 - IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita with Additional Controls for DE Albouy
Full Sample British Colonies Full Sample
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the
corresponding first stage. The omitted group in Columns 1 and 2 is all countries that were neither French nor British colonies. All specifications are estimated using Stata's 
ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
41(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Protection against expro- 0.93 1 0.85 0.98 0.94 1 0.79 0.79 0.94 1.03
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.16]** [0.21]** [0.14]** [0.21]** [0.14]** [0.19]** [0.10]** [0.15]** [0.16]** [0.22]**
Latitude (standardized) -0.08 -0.18 -0.08 0.00 -0.1
[0.13] [0.15] [0.12] [0.12] [0.14]
Bristish colony dummy -0.64 -0.68
[0.29]* [0.33]*
French colony dummy 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.14
[0.30] [0.36] [0.27] [0.33]
French legal origin dummy 0.71 0.75 0.7 0.74
[0.28]* [0.32]* [0.27]** [0.31]*
% of population Muslim 0.003 0.003
[0.004] [0.005]
% of population Catholic 0.012 0.012
[0.003]** [0.004]**
DE Albouy Adjusted -1.02 -0.91 -1.47 -1.43 -1.07 -0.98 -1.15 -0.98 -1.01 -0.87
[0.23]** [0.30]** [0.26]** [0.48]** [0.23]** [0.30]** [0.24]** [0.31]** [0.24]** [0.30]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.16
[0.19] [0.28] [0.18] [0.21] [0.19]
Bristish colony dummy 0.94 0.9
[0.32]** [0.32]**
French colony dummy -0.49 -0.55 -0.62 -0.68
[0.36] [0.38] [0.31] [0.32]*
French legal origin dummy -0.94 -0.92 -0.8 -0.75
[0.32]** [0.32]** [0.34]* [0.34]*
% of population Muslim -0.011 -0.013
[0.006]* [0.006]*
% of population Catholic -0.015 -0.015
[0.004]** [0.005]**
Observations 62 62 22 22 62 62 62 62 62 62
Clusters 37 37 21 21 37 37 37 37 37 37
R-squared (1st stage) 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.4
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 6.4 - IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita with Additional Controls for DE Albouy Adjusted
Full Sample British Colonies Full Sample
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the
corresponding first stage. The omitted group in Columns 1 and 2 is all countries that were neither French nor British colonies. All specifications are estimated using Stata's 
ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
42(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Protection against expro- 0.72 0.73 0.87 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.78 0.75 0.88 0.79
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.12]** [0.13]** [0.15]** [0.16]** [0.13]** [0.15]** [0.12]** [0.09]** [0.13]** [0.11]**
Malaria Ecology -0.19 -0.2
(standardized) [0.13] [0.13]
Latitude (standardized) -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
[0.10] [0.12] [0.12]
Religious fractionalization -0.7 -0.31
[0.45] [0.40]
Linguistic fractionalization -1.01 -1.19
[0.32]** [0.38]**
Ethnic fractionalization -0.76 0.58
[0.41] [0.48]
Oil dummy 0.08 0.08
(reserves > 500,000 b /pop) [0.25] [0.29]
Landlocked dummy 0.44 0.45
[0.37] [0.38]
DE Albouy Adjusted -0.96 -0.88 -0.92 -0.83 -0.98 -0.88 -0.93 -0.95 -0.95 -0.81
[0.23]** [0.26]** [0.20]** [0.22]** [0.21]** [0.24]** [0.21]** [0.20]** [0.19]** [0.18]**
Malaria Ecology -0.01 0
(standardized) [0.17] [0.17]
Latitude (standardized) 0.152 0.15 0.18
[0.169] [0.16] [0.17]
Religious fractionalization 0.48 0.94
[0.58] [0.66]
Linguistic fractionalization 0.11 0.69
[0.47] [0.62]
Ethnic fractionalization -0.36 -1.88
[0.64] [0.74]*
Oil dummy 1.22 1.29
(reserves > 500,000 b /pop) [0.52]* [0.56]*
Landlocked dummy -1.26 -1.26
[0.40]** [0.38]**
Observations 63 63 64 64 64 64 64 62 64 62
Clusters 35 35 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
R-squared (1st stage) 0.35 0.36 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.4 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.42
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 7.1 - Robustness Checks for the IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita for DE AJR
(1), (2) w/o Malta Full sample (8), (10) w/o Haiti, El Salvador 
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the corresponding
first stage. Malaria Ecology is a measure of the geographic potential for malaria from Kiszewski et al. (2004). The three measures of fractionalisation are taken from Alesina et 
al. (2003). All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
43(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Protection against expro- 0.71 0.73 0.89 0.92 0.87 0.89 0.8 0.76 0.88 0.81
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.13]** [0.17]** [0.16]** [0.19]** [0.15]** [0.18]** [0.14]** [0.11]** [0.14]** [0.13]**
Malaria Ecology -0.2 -0.2
(standardized) [0.13] [0.13]
Latitude (standardized) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
[0.12] [0.14] [0.14]
Religious fractionalization -0.7 -0.34
[0.45] [0.40]
Linguistic fractionalization -1 -1.19
[0.33]** [0.39]**
Ethnic fractionalization -0.74 0.62
[0.43] [0.50]
Oil dummy 0.06 0.03
(reserves > 500,000 b /pop) [0.26] [0.33]
Landlocked dummy 0.47 0.5
[0.39] [0.41]
DE Albouy Adjusted -1.18 -1.06 -1.15 -1.02 -1.22 -1.07 -1.15 -1.17 -1.2 -0.97
[0.33]** [0.39]* [0.27]** [0.31]** [0.28]** [0.34]** [0.29]** [0.28]** [0.25]** [0.24]**
Malaria Ecology -0.04 -0.04
(standardized) [0.18] [0.19]
Latitude (standardized) 0.14 0.14 0.17
[0.217] [0.21] [0.22]
Religious fractionalization 0.79 1.32
[0.63] [0.68]
Linguistic fractionalization 0.02 0.58
[0.49] [0.64]
Ethnic fractionalization -0.46 -2.05
[0.68] [0.78]*
Oil dummy 1.09 1.16
(reserves > 500,000 b /pop) [0.52]* [0.57]*
Landlocked dummy -1.29 -1.3
[0.41]** [0.39]**
Observations 63 63 64 64 64 64 64 62 64 62
Clusters 35 35 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
R-squared (1st stage) 0.3 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.3 0.32 0.39
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 7.2 - Robustness Checks for the IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita for DE AJR Adjusted
(1), (2) w/o Malta Full sample (8), (10) w/o Haiti, El Salvador 
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the corresponding
first stage. Malaria Ecology is a measure of the geographic potential for malaria from Kiszewski et al. (2004). The three measures of fractionalisation are taken from Alesina et 
al. (2003). All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
44(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Protection against expro- 0.75 0.83 0.9 0.98 0.89 0.96 0.83 0.79 0.9 0.84
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.14]** [0.18]** [0.16]** [0.20]** [0.15]** [0.20]** [0.14]** [0.11]** [0.15]** [0.14]**
Malaria Ecology -0.17 -0.18
(standardized) [0.15] [0.17]
Latitude (standardized) -0.12 -0.11 -0.11
[0.11] [0.14] [0.14]
Religious fractionalization -0.6 -0.36
[0.45] [0.43]
Linguistic fractionalization -0.85 -1.07
[0.36]* [0.43]*
Ethnic fractionalization -0.57 0.69
[0.43] [0.52]
Oil dummy 0.01 -0.13
(reserves > 500,000 b /pop) [0.26] [0.32]
Landlocked dummy 0.45 0.55
[0.38] [0.43]
DE Albouy Adjusted -0.99 -0.89 -0.98 -0.87 -1.03 -0.89 -0.98 -1.01 -1.01 -0.84
[0.31]** [0.35]* [0.24]** [0.28]** [0.27]** [0.31]** [0.26]** [0.25]** [0.24]** [0.24]**
Malaria Ecology -0.04 -0.04
(standardized) [0.22] [0.23]
Latitude (standardized) 0.165 0.16 0.2
[0.200] [0.19] [0.20]
Religious fractionalization 0.74 1.21
[0.60] [0.67]
Linguistic fractionalization 0.12 0.7
[0.59] [0.69]
Ethnic fractionalization -0.42 -2.03
[0.71] [0.74]**
Oil dummy 1.11 1.2
(reserves > 500,000 b /pop) [0.57] [0.61]
Landlocked dummy -1.35 -1.34
[0.37]** [0.36]**
Observations 61 61 62 62 62 62 62 60 62 60
Clusters 36 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
R-squared (1st stage) 0.3 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.39
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 7.3 - Robustness Checks for the IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita for DE Albouy
(1), (2) w/o Malta Full sample (8), (10) w/o Haiti, El Salvador 
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the corresponding
first stage. Malaria Ecology is a measure of the geographic potential for malaria from Kiszewski et al. (2004). The three measures of fractionalisation are taken from Alesina et 
al. (2003). All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
45(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Protection against expro- 0.76 0.86 0.92 1.03 0.91 1.01 0.85 0.81 0.91 0.86
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.16]** [0.22]** [0.17]** [0.22]** [0.16]** [0.23]** [0.15]** [0.12]** [0.16]** [0.15]**
Malaria Ecology -0.17 -0.16
(standardized) [0.16] [0.18]
Latitude (standardized) -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
[0.13] [0.16] [0.17]
Religious fractionalization -0.61 -0.4
[0.45] [0.44]
Linguistic fractionalization -0.84 -1.07
[0.37]* [0.44]*
Ethnic fractionalization -0.55 0.74
[0.45] [0.55]
Oil dummy -0.01 -0.2
(reserves > 500,000 b /pop) [0.27] [0.35]
Landlocked dummy 0.48 0.62
[0.40] [0.47]
DE Albouy Adjusted -1.05 -0.92 -1.06 -0.93 -1.12 -0.94 -1.06 -1.08 -1.11 -0.89
[0.35]** [0.41]* [0.27]** [0.31]** [0.30]** [0.35]* [0.30]** [0.28]** [0.27]** [0.27]**
Malaria Ecology -0.07 -0.07
(standardized) [0.22] [0.24]
Latitude (standardized) 0.173 0.16 0.21
[0.221] [0.21] [0.22]
Religious fractionalization 0.89 1.39
[0.62] [0.68]*
Linguistic fractionalization 0.06 0.63
[0.60] [0.70]
Ethnic fractionalization -0.46 -2.09
[0.74] [0.77]**
Oil dummy 1.05 1.16
(reserves > 500,000 b /pop) [0.57] [0.60]
Landlocked dummy -1.36 -1.36
[0.38]** [0.37]**
Observations 61 61 62 62 62 62 62 60 62 60
Clusters 36 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
R-squared (1st stage) 0.27 0.28 0.35 0.36 0.3 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.3 0.37
Panel B: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 7.4 - Robustness Checks for the IV Regressions of Log GDP per Capita for DE Albouy Adjusted
(1), (2) w/o Malta Full sample (8), (10) w/o Haiti, El Salvador 
Notes: Panel B reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the corresponding
first stage. Malaria Ecology is a measure of the geographic potential for malaria from Kiszewski et al. (2004). The three measures of fractionalisation are taken from Alesina et 
al. (2003). All specifications are estimated using Stata's ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
469 Additional Instruments and Overidentiﬁcation Tests
In this section, I introduce further instruments for institutions and check whether the instrumented
institutional scores are mutually consistent, i.e., I test the overidentiﬁed system. The additional
instruments I use are scores of democracy in the early 19th century (the "Polity" score and the
score for "Constraints on the Executive" from the Polity IV database), colonial and legal origin
dummies and the fraction of the population from European descent.
The results are reported in the now familiar way, where Panel A of Tables 8.1 to 8.4 reports the
ﬁrst stage results with the new instruments included. In all but one speciﬁcation, the measure of
disease environment is a signiﬁcant instrument, while most of the additional instruments are not
signiﬁcant determinants of property rights institutions. Panel C reports the instrumented second
stage, again with similar results as in earlier speciﬁcations: institutions are a major determinant of
economic performance. In Panel B, I report the overidentiﬁcation tests. Since heteroscedasticity
is a potential concern, I do not report a Hausman test for the overidentiﬁcation restriction, but I
report the Sargan-Hansen C-statistic for the orthogonality of the measures of disease environment
(also the Hausman test does not reject in any speciﬁcation).
In the 10 instrumental variable estimations for each of the four measures of disease environment
of Tables 8.1 to 8.4, I ﬁrst include the percentage of population in 1975 that is of European
descent in Column 1. This is done to address the worry that the results presented so far are
simply resulting from the fact that Europeans brought with them a culture geared towards better
property rights protection (or brought with them more human capital as is the theory of Glaeser
et al. (2004)). The fraction of the population from Europe is never a signiﬁcant determinant of
institutional quality. Additionally, the overidentiﬁcation test are of extremely low power, with
the lowest p-value in any of the Columns 1 equal to 0.44. In addition to testing the exclusion
restriction, I also control for the direct eﬀects geography has on development by adding latitude
in Column 2. I ﬁnd no diﬀerent results than in Column 1, except that there is one case (Table
8.4, Column 2) in which the measure of disease environment is not signiﬁcant when the additional
instrument is included.
I next introduce two measures of early institutional measure. Following Acemoglu et al., I
ﬁrst focus on the early Polity score from the Polity IV data base as an additional instrument.
This measure takes values between -10 and +10 and is higher for more democratic societies. In
Column 3 of each of the Tables in this section, I include all countries with an available Polity
47score in the period of 1900 to 1910 (I use the earliest available score). Few countries in the sample
of former colonies were independent at that time and there are thus only 25 observations. While
the policy score is not signiﬁcant, disease environment is and again, the overidentiﬁcation test
does not reject. I repeat this estimation in Column 4, but this time I include all countries with
an available Polity score before 1961, hence yielding 48 countries, and similar results as in the
previous speciﬁcation. In Column 4, I again always use the earliest available Polity score after
1900 given that one was available before 1961.
Next, in Columns 5 and 6 of Tables 8.1 to 8.4, I repeat this exercise, but I focus on a sub-
indicator of the Polity database, "Constraint on the Executive." This variable takes values between
1 and 7 and measures whether superimposed structures and rules eﬀectively constrain the exec-
utive. I again include ﬁrst all countries that have a Polity score in the period of 1900 to 1910
and still exist today (Column 5) and then those with a polity score before 1961 (Column 6). In
both regressions, constraints on the executive are not signiﬁcant, disease environment is, and the
overidentiﬁcation test does not reject.
I next add colony dummies (Columns 7 and 8) and a French colony and legal origin dummy
(columns 9 an 10). When including a French and British colony dummy in Columns 7 and 8, I ﬁnd
that the British colony dummy is always positive and always signiﬁcant, while the French colony
dummy is always negative, but never signiﬁcant. When including a French legal origin dummy
and a French colony dummy, both are negative and sometimes signiﬁcantly so. Also in Columns
7 to 10, disease environment is signiﬁcant also when the respective instruments are included, and
the overidentiﬁcation test never rejects.
Overall, I conclude that the exclusion restriction that disease environment matters for in-
stitutions only indirectly through settler mortality is never rejected when adding various other
instruments for institutions while also controlling for the direct eﬀects of geography by including
latitude.
48(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1911 1961 1911 1961
Protection against expro- 0.87 0.89 0.49 0.73 0.48 0.71 0.75 0.71 0.73 0.67
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.14]** [0.15]** [0.04]** [0.09]** [0.04]** [0.08]** [0.09]** [0.08]** [0.09]** [0.09]**
Latitude -0.02 0.08 0.09
[0.12] [0.09] [0.10]
p-value Sargan C statistic 0.442 0.387 0.565 0.578 0.531 0.275 0.131 0.25 0.118 0.225
for DE AJR
DE AJR -0.76 -0.75 -1.28 -1.03 -1.23 -1 -0.86 -0.76 -0.86 -0.75
[0.25]** [0.27]** [0.17]** [0.21]** [0.20]** [0.21]** [0.17]** [0.20]** [0.18]** [0.21]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.05 0.16 0.19
[0.17] [0.15] [0.16]
% European descent (1975) 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01]
Earliest Polity score  0.04 0.02
[0.03] [0.03]
Earliest executive const. 0.13 0.08
[0.08] [0.08]
French legal origin dummy -0.57 -0.56
[0.32] [0.31]
British colony dummy 0.7 0.67
[0.30]* [0.29]*
French colony dummy -0.51 -0.58 -0.6 -0.67
[0.35] [0.37] [0.31] [0.32]*
Observations 64 64 25 48 25 48 64 64 64 64
Clusters 36 36 11 28 11 28 36 36 36 36
R-squared (1st stage) 0.38 0.38 0.66 0.45 0.67 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.45
Panel C: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel B: Overidentification Tests
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 8.1 - Overidentification Tests for DE AJR
Full Sample Polity Score Available Before Full Sample
Notes: Panel C reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the corresponding
first stage. Panel B reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on average protection against expropriation (in Panel C) is the same when instrumented using 
the measure of disease environment in addition to the respective instruments. The C Statistic (difference-in-Sargan) is reported. All specifications are estimated using Stata's 
ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
49(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1911 1961 1911 1961
Protection against expro- 0.89 0.93 0.49 0.74 0.48 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.7 0.63
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.15]** [0.18]** [0.04]** [0.10]** [0.03]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.10]**
Latitude -0.05 0.09 0.12
[0.13] [0.09] [0.10]
p-value Sargan C statistic 0.559 0.532 0.587 0.500 0.537 0.229 0.124 0.293 0.120 0.289
for DE AJR Adjusted
DE AJR Adjusted -0.85 -0.84 -1.56 -1.22 -1.5 -1.19 -1.1 -0.98 -1.1 -0.94
[0.31]** [0.37]* [0.23]** [0.28]** [0.30]** [0.28]** [0.22]** [0.29]** [0.23]** [0.30]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.01 0.13 0.17
[0.21] [0.19] [0.19]
% European descent (1975) 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01]
Earliest Polity score  0.05 0.03
[0.03] [0.03]
Earliest executive const. 0.15 0.11
[0.09] [0.08]
French legal origin dummy -0.71 -0.68
[0.34]* [0.34]*
British colony dummy 0.84 0.8
[0.32]* [0.32]*
French colony dummy -0.48 -0.54 -0.59 -0.65
[0.35] [0.38] [0.30] [0.31]*
Observations 64 64 25 48 25 48 64 64 64 64
Clusters 36 36 11 28 11 28 36 36 36 36
R-squared (1st stage) 0.33 0.33 0.62 0.38 0.62 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.4 0.41
Panel C: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel B: Overidentification Tests
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 8.2 - Overidentification Tests for DE AJR Adjusted
Full Sample Polity Score Available Before Full Sample
Notes: Panel C reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the corresponding
first stage. Panel B reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on average protection against expropriation (in Panel C) is the same when instrumented using 
the measure of disease environment in addition to the respective instruments. The C Statistic (difference-in-Sargan) is reported. All specifications are estimated using Stata's 
ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
50(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1911 1961 1911 1961
Protection against expro- 0.89 0.98 0.49 0.75 0.48 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.71
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.15]** [0.18]** [0.04]** [0.09]** [0.04]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.08]** [0.09]** [0.09]**
Latitude -0.12 0.03 0.03
[0.13] [0.08] [0.08]
p-value Sargan C statistic 0.939 0.828 0.564 0.485 0.527 0.223 0.154 0.255 0.149 0.276
for DE Albouy
DE Albouy -0.73 -0.71 -1.47 -1.07 -1.41 -1.04 -0.92 -0.82 -0.92 -0.8
[0.29]* [0.33]* [0.23]** [0.27]** [0.26]** [0.27]** [0.21]** [0.26]** [0.21]** [0.26]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.05 0.14 0.17
[0.19] [0.18] [0.17]
% European descent (1975) 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01]
Earliest Polity score  0.04 0.03
[0.03] [0.03]
Earliest executive const. 0.14 0.1
[0.08] [0.08]
French legal origin dummy -0.73 -0.69
[0.34]* [0.33]*
British colony dummy 0.88 0.83
[0.31]** [0.30]**
French colony dummy -0.49 -0.55 -0.62 -0.68
[0.36] [0.38] [0.31] [0.33]*
Observations 62 62 25 48 25 48 62 62 62 62
Clusters 37 37 13 29 13 29 37 37 37 37
R-squared (1st stage) 0.34 0.34 0.65 0.39 0.66 0.4 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.42
Panel C: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel B: Overidentification Tests
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 8.3 - Overidentification Tests for DE Albouy
Full Sample Polity Score Available Before Full Sample
Notes: Panel C reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the corresponding
first stage. Panel B reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on average protection against expropriation (in Panel C) is the same when instrumented using 
the measure of disease environment in addition to the respective instruments. The C Statistic (difference-in-Sargan) is reported. All specifications are estimated using Stata's 
ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
51(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1911 1961 1911 1961
Protection against expro- 0.9 1.01 0.49 0.75 0.48 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.7
priation risk, 1985-1995 [0.15]** [0.19]** [0.04]** [0.10]** [0.03]** [0.10]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.09]**
Latitude -0.14 0.03 0.04
[0.14] [0.08] [0.08]
p-value Sargan C statistic 0.920 0.982 0.576 0.444 0.531 0.199 0.144 0.244 0.144 0.279
for DE Albouy Adjusted
DE Albouy Adjusted -0.73 -0.71 -1.6 -1.12 -1.53 -1.1 -1.02 -0.91 -1.01 -0.87
[0.30]* [0.35] [0.25]** [0.30]** [0.31]** [0.30]** [0.23]** [0.30]** [0.24]** [0.30]**
Latitude (standardized) 0.04 0.13 0.16
[0.21] [0.19] [0.19]
% European descent (1975) 0.01 0.01
[0.01] [0.01]
Earliest Polity score  0.05 0.03
[0.03] [0.03]
Earliest executive const. 0.15 0.12
[0.08] [0.08]
French legal origin dummy -0.8 -0.75
[0.34]* [0.34]*
British colony dummy 0.94 0.9
[0.32]** [0.32]**
French colony dummy -0.49 -0.55 -0.62 -0.68
[0.36] [0.38] [0.31] [0.32]*
Observations 62 62 25 48 25 48 62 62 62 62
Clusters 37 37 13 29 13 29 37 37 37 37
R-squared (1st stage) 0.32 0.32 0.62 0.35 0.63 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.4
Panel C: Second Stage Results for Log GDP per Capita 
Panel B: Overidentification Tests
Panel A: First Stage for Average Protection Against Expropriation Risk
Table 8.4 - Overidentification Tests for DE Albouy Adjusted
Full Sample Polity Score Available Before Full Sample
Notes: Panel C reports the two-stage least-squares estimates with log GDP per capita in 1995 (PPP adjusted) as the dependent variable, and Panel A reports the corresponding
first stage. Panel B reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the coefficient on average protection against expropriation (in Panel C) is the same when instrumented using 
the measure of disease environment in addition to the respective instruments. The C Statistic (difference-in-Sargan) is reported. All specifications are estimated using Stata's 
ivreg2 command (see Baum et al. (2006)); clustered and heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are reported in brackets; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
5210 Conclusion
This paper does neither assess whether Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson or James Robinson
are consistent when they assemble their settler mortality data, nor does it examine the data
revisions of David Albouy. For many countries, there are both multiple mortality rates within a
given historical source such as Curtin (1998), as well as multiple mortality rates across historical
sources. Thus, I argue that a discussion of how to choose mortality rates is somewhat pointless:
one can never be sure that all possible historical sources of mortality rates have been exhausted,
and therefore the validity of the colonial origins theory cannot be established beyond any doubt
when using historical data.
The main contribution of this paper is to instrument for historical settler mortality rates with
a geographic model of the determinants of mortality during colonization. The geographic variables
used in this study — such as average temperature or rainfall — are measured precisely, are shown to
be strongly related to mortality and the constructed instruments are also shown to be otherwise
excludable to institutional outcomes.
After establishing the validity of my instruments, I repeat the analysis of Acemoglu et al. I
ﬁnd strong support for their theory of the colonial origins of comparative development. First,
I show that the relation between institutional outcomes and the instrumented mortality rate is
highly signiﬁcant in both the sample of Acemoglu et al. and when using the data constructed
by Albouy. The latter ﬁnding is robust to inclusion of controls and to accounting for the pop-
ulation the historical data was collected from (bishops, from forced labor or during campaign).
Second, I establish the eﬀect institutions have on international income diﬀerentials by using the
constructed measures of disease environment to instrument for institutional outcomes. I ﬁnd that
for all measures of early disease environment constructed in this paper, institutions are a highly
signiﬁcant determinant of economic prosperity. In addition, my point estimates are similar to the
ones of Acemoglu et al. I thus conclude that their results indeed do reﬂect the "early institution
building" channel rather than measurement error, as is asserted by Albouy.
While I do not check the rules according to which the data is assembled, I show that the
discrepancies between the two mortality series vanish when instrumenting in the proposed way.
Although the two mortality series diﬀer substantially, they are both aﬀected by geography in a
very similar way. Correspondingly, for both the results relating mortality to institutions and for
the results relating institutions to income, it does not matter which series is instrumented for to
53generate the geographic projection of mortality. Both show that the colonial origins theory is
statistically valid and economically highly relevant. Moreover, although I ﬁnd that one aspect of
David Albouy’s critique is supported by the data (the "comparability problem"), accounting for
the population the mortality rate was sampled from does not change the eﬀect institutions have
on prosperity.
This paper also has a second contribution because the developed instruments allow for an
additional falsiﬁcation exercise to disentangle the colonial origins theory from the potential direct
eﬀect disease environment may have had on institutional development. The geographic view of
development (advocated for example by Gallup et al. (1998)) predicts that there should be a rela-
tion between disease environment and economic development in all countries equally. In contrast,
the colonial origins theory predicts a relation between disease environment and development only
in the group of former colonies. My measures of early disease environment can be constructed also
for countries that have not been colonized and I can thus show that early disease environment did
inﬂuence institutional development in former colonies, yet not in a sample of countries that have
not been colonized. This diﬀerential eﬀect disease environment has had on economic development
can only be rationalized in the context of the colonial origins theory brought forward by Acemoglu
et al.
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5711 Data Appendix
11.1 Data for Former Colonies (Main Data)
Figure A 1: The relation between the logarithm of mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001) and 
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Logarithm of Mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001)













































































































2 4 6 8
Logarithm from Mortality of Acemoglu et al. (2001)
Mort. from Acemoglu et al. (2001) and DE AJR Adjusted
Figure A 2: The relation between the logarithm of mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001) and 
the geographic projection adjusted for the sampling population (DE AJR Adjusted from Table 







































































































2 4 6 8
Logarithm of Mortality from Albouy (2006) (Revision 2)
Mort. from Albouy (2006) and DE Albouy
Figure A 3: The relation between the logarithm of mortality from Albouy (2006) and the 













































































































2 4 6 8
Logarithm of Mortality from Albouy (2006)
Mort. from Albouy (2006) and DE Albouy Adjusted
Figure A 4: The relation between the logarithm of mortality from Albouy (2006) and the 
geographic projection adjusted for the sampling population (DE Albouy Adjusted from Table 1, 
Column 6). 
 
59Country Name Worldbank  Avg. Exprop. Log GPD Ln Mortality  Ln Mortality  DE DE DE DE
Code Risk per Capita Acem. et al.  Albouy AJR  AJR Adj.  Albouy Albouy Adj. 
Algeria DZA 6.50 8.39 4.359 4.359 3.756 3.016 3.796 3.401
Angola AGO 5.36 7.77 5.635 5.991 5.275 4.291 5.018 4.558
Argentina ARG 6.39 9.13 4.233 4.233 3.509 3.120 3.628 3.429
Australia AUS 9.32 9.90 2.146 2.646 2.604 2.300 2.877 2.673
Bahamas, The BHS 7.50 9.29 4.443 5.242 4.701 4.002 4.650 4.305
Bangladesh BGD 5.14 6.88 4.268 4.268 5.548 4.476 5.401 4.890
Bolivia BOL 5.64 7.93 4.263 4.263 3.872 3.100 3.768 3.422
Brazil BRA 7.91 8.73 4.263 4.263 4.520 3.905 4.501 4.193
Burkina Faso BFA 4.45 6.85 5.635 5.991 5.745 4.673 5.510 4.999
Cameroon CMR 6.45 7.50 5.635 5.991 5.018 4.186 4.946 4.541
Canada CAN 9.73 9.99 2.779 2.779 2.310 2.057 2.525 2.409
Chile CHL 7.82 9.34 4.233 4.233 3.278 2.624 3.351 3.002
Colombia COL 7.32 8.81 4.263 4.263 3.386 2.963 3.515 3.306
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR 3.50 6.87 5.481 4.605 5.265 4.279 5.062 4.598
Congo, Rep. COG 4.68 7.42 5.481 4.605 5.402 4.365 5.203 4.713
Costa Rica CRI 7.05 8.79 4.358 4.358 4.972 4.015 4.835 4.386
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 7.00 7.44 6.504 6.504 5.054 4.301 5.129 4.744
Dominican Rep. DOM 6.18 8.36 4.868 4.868 4.754 4.067 4.713 4.372
Ecuador ECU 6.55 8.47 4.263 4.263 4.017 3.300 3.972 3.640
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY 6.77 7.95 4.217 3.207 4.956 4.031 4.683 4.256
El Salvador SLV 5.00 7.95 4.358 4.358 5.272 4.276 5.118 4.646
Ethiopia ETH 5.73 6.11 3.258 3.258 4.605 3.689 4.498 4.074
Gabon GAB 7.82 8.90 5.635 5.991 5.633 4.573 5.457 4.951
Gambia, The GMB 8.27 7.27 7.293 7.293 5.569 4.467 5.437 4.913
Ghana GHA 6.27 7.37 6.504 6.504 5.189 4.307 5.024 4.600
Guatemala GTM 5.14 8.29 4.263 4.263 4.787 3.843 4.646 4.208
Guinea GIN 6.55 7.49 6.180 5.858 6.782 5.389 6.869 6.180
Guyana GUY 5.89 7.90 3.471 4.431 4.316 3.936 4.520 4.297
Haiti HTI 3.73 7.15 4.868 4.868 4.952 4.212 4.900 4.532
Honduras HND 5.32 7.69 4.358 4.556 4.975 4.017 4.773 4.328
Hong Kong (Ch) HKG 8.14 10.05 2.701 5.652 4.645 3.889 4.676 4.305
India IND 8.27 7.33 3.884 3.884 5.122 4.162 4.915 4.465
Indonesia IDN 7.59 8.07 5.136 5.136 4.959 4.274 4.974 4.624
Jamaica JAM 7.09 8.19 4.868 4.868 5.101 4.228 4.944 4.526
Kenya KEN 6.05 7.06 4.977 na 4.416 3.613 na na
Madagascar MDG 4.45 6.84 6.284 4.317 4.645 3.746 4.546 4.127
Malaysia MYS 7.95 8.89 2.874 2.874 4.007 3.826 4.326 4.183
Mali MLI 4.00 6.57 7.986 5.991 5.833 4.735 5.618 5.093
Malta MLT 7.23 9.43 2.791 2.791 3.903 3.153 3.920 3.518
Mexico MEX 7.50 8.94 4.263 4.263 4.353 3.494 4.217 3.825
Morocco MAR 7.09 8.04 4.359 4.359 3.964 3.212 3.965 3.563
New Zealand NZL 9.73 9.76 2.146 2.146 2.943 2.787 3.221 3.122
Nicaragua NIC 5.23 7.54 5.096 5.096 5.571 4.521 5.362 4.864
Niger NER 5.00 6.73 5.991 5.991 5.634 4.594 5.374 4.881
Nigeria NGA 5.55 6.81 7.603 7.603 5.461 4.557 5.422 4.974
Pakistan PAK 6.05 7.35 3.611 3.611 4.887 3.999 4.767 4.347
Panama PAN 5.91 8.84 5.096 5.096 5.373 4.417 5.204 4.746
Paraguay PRY 6.95 8.21 4.358 4.358 4.325 3.706 4.319 4.015
Peru PER 5.77 8.40 4.263 4.263 4.779 3.873 4.522 4.107
Senegal SEN 6.00 7.40 5.104 5.104 5.626 4.572 5.392 4.892
Sierra Leone SLE 5.82 6.25 6.180 5.858 6.289 5.039 6.263 5.652
Singapore SGP 9.32 10.15 2.874 2.996 2.768 3.237 3.466 3.592
South Africa ZAF 6.86 8.89 2.741 2.741 3.381 2.750 3.467 3.123
Sri Lanka LKA 6.05 7.73 4.246 4.246 4.519 4.052 4.704 4.442
Sudan SDN 4.00 7.31 4.480 2.389 5.489 4.491 5.196 4.726
Tanzania TZA 6.64 6.25 4.977 na 4.957 4.000 na na
Togo TGO 6.91 7.22 6.504 6.504 5.189 4.307 5.024 4.600
Trinidad and Tob. TTO 7.45 8.77 4.443 4.666 4.745 4.082 4.749 4.414
Tunisia TUN 6.45 8.48 4.143 4.143 3.886 3.169 3.898 3.511
Uganda UGA 4.45 6.97 5.635 5.991 4.392 3.819 4.419 4.129
United States USA 10.00 10.22 2.708 2.708 2.893 2.642 3.106 2.974
Uruguay URY 7.00 9.03 4.263 4.263 3.600 3.273 3.747 3.569
Venezuela, VEN 7.14 9.07 4.358 4.358 4.555 3.723 4.398 4.012
Vietnam VNM 6.41 7.28 4.942 4.942 5.162 4.268 5.076 4.643
Table A1 - List of the Data (Main Analysis)
6011.2 Data for Non-Colonies
This is the list of data used in Section 6. For these countries, the measures of mortality rates
have been predicted out of sample using the respective coeﬃcents from Table 1.
Country Name Worldbank  Rule of Avg. Exprop. DE DE DE DE Warsaw Pact
Code Law Risk AJR  AJR Adj.  Albouy Albouy Adj.  Dummy
Afghanistan AFG . -1.614 3.811 2.992 3.675 3.314 0
Albania ALB 7.26 -0.749 2.857 2.427 3.132 2.871 1
Andorra ADO . 1.472 2.060 1.756 2.371 2.180 0
Armenia ARM . -0.477 3.435 2.725 3.345 3.035 1
Austria AUT 9.74 1.959 2.951 2.508 3.040 2.838 0
Azerbaijan AZE . -0.870 3.977 3.207 3.840 3.494 1
Belarus BLR . -1.105 2.645 2.214 2.750 2.561 1
Belgium BEL 9.69 1.497 2.910 2.568 3.063 2.898 0
Bosnia and Herz. BIH . -0.739 2.144 1.828 2.437 2.241 0
Bulgaria BGR 9.04 -0.077 3.231 2.678 3.252 3.003 1
China CHN 8.11 -0.347 4.026 3.173 3.939 3.555 0
Croatia HRV . -0.055 2.118 1.894 2.468 2.306 0
Czech Republic CZE 9.88 0.645 3.014 2.418 3.007 2.749 1
Denmark DNK 9.72 1.962 3.053 2.552 3.100 2.875 0
Estonia EST . 0.658 2.717 2.281 2.810 2.617 1
Finland FIN 9.72 2.036 2.717 2.281 2.810 2.617 0
France FRA 9.71 1.440 3.446 2.924 3.468 3.225 0
Georgia GEO . -0.842 3.796 3.091 3.712 3.393 1
Germany DEU 9.88 1.813 2.958 2.509 3.039 2.835 0
Greece GRC 7.48 0.738 3.392 2.750 3.462 3.115 0
Hungary HUN 9.08 0.794 3.128 2.625 3.172 2.945 1
Iceland ISL 9.70 1.926 2.642 2.252 2.774 2.599 0
Ireland IRL 9.72 1.743 2.928 2.532 3.039 2.855 0
Italy ITA 9.46 0.882 3.132 2.569 3.283 2.970 0
Japan JPN 9.72 1.576 3.618 3.132 3.744 3.503 0
Kazakhstan KAZ . -0.839 3.167 2.474 3.074 2.778 1
Korea, Dem. Rep. PRK 5.02 -1.092 3.703 2.944 3.674 3.332 0
Korea, Rep. KOR 8.57 0.753 3.904 3.156 3.948 3.601 0
Kyrgyz Republic KGZ . -0.815 2.701 2.168 2.754 2.526 1
Latvia LVA . 0.281 2.627 2.200 2.727 2.541 1
Liechtenstein LIE . 1.438 2.595 2.357 2.835 2.715 0
Lithuania LTU . 0.270 2.717 2.281 2.810 2.617 1
Luxembourg LUX 10.00 1.961 2.991 2.565 3.089 2.892 0
Macedonia, FYR MKD . -0.420 2.129 1.813 2.409 2.214 0
Moldova MDA . -0.411 3.292 2.746 3.318 3.070 1
Monaco MCO . 0.772 3.024 2.517 3.206 2.916 0
Mongolia MNG 7.95 0.247 2.513 1.844 2.481 2.209 0
Nepal NPL . -0.442 4.729 3.769 4.632 4.186 0
Netherlands NLD 9.98 1.900 3.009 2.569 3.091 2.890 0
Norway NOR 9.85 2.033 2.913 2.379 2.957 2.723 0
Poland POL 7.81 0.549 3.010 2.501 3.067 2.839 1
Portugal PRT 9.01 1.243 3.583 2.889 3.639 3.267 0
Romania ROM 7.56 -0.218 3.216 2.643 3.244 2.987 1
Russian Fed. RUS 8.50 -0.805 2.555 2.133 2.668 2.484 1
San Marino SMR . 0.772 3.132 2.569 3.283 2.970 0
Saudi Arabia SAU 7.44 0.572 4.890 3.969 4.631 4.206 0
Slovak Republic SVK 9.00 0.278 2.989 2.450 3.023 2.785 1
Slovenia SVN . 0.858 1.846 1.653 2.221 2.076 0
Spain ESP 9.55 1.235 2.924 2.373 3.048 2.747 0
Sweden SWE 9.50 1.934 2.996 2.450 3.022 2.782 0
Switzerland CHE 9.99 2.137 2.685 2.437 2.918 2.792 0
Taiwan TWN 9.24 0.949 3.946 3.535 4.143 3.918 0
Tajikistan TJK . -1.316 3.987 3.177 3.834 3.473 1
Thailand THA 7.64 0.296 5.605 4.578 5.413 4.922 0
Turkey TUR 7.29 0.052 3.485 2.785 3.397 3.089 0
Turkmenistan TKM . -1.219 3.990 3.204 3.828 3.477 1
Ukraine UKR . -0.765 2.840 2.344 2.905 2.687 1
United Kingdom GBR 9.76 1.875 3.322 2.828 3.362 3.133 0
Uzbekistan UZB . -1.106 3.900 3.124 3.746 3.401 1
Yugo., Fed. Rep. YUG 6.36 -0.952 1.846 1.653 2.221 2.076 0
Table A1 - List of the Data (Falsification Exercise)
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